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Abstract
In September 1998, the Judicial Conference of the United States abandoned
its latest attempt to regulate the timing of interviews and offers in the law
clerk selection process. This paper surveys the further unraveling of the
market since then, makes comparisons with other entry level professional
labor markets, and evaluates some possibilities for reform.
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Prologue: In September of 1998 the Judicial Conference
abandoned its most recent attempt to regulate the timing of
interviews and offers in the process for hiring federal judicial
law clerks. In September of 1999 most prominent law schools
abandoned or cut back their attempts to regulate the time at
which faculty recommendation letters could be sent. Thus the
law clerk hiring process now gets underway at the beginning of
the second year of law school, two years before the clerkship
positions themselves begin.
What is going on here, and what, if anything, should be done about it?
To answer the first question, we present a wide range of new and systematic
empirical data from judges and students about their experiences in the market
for federal judicial law clerks, and we show how the problems of this market
resemble problems in a broad set of other markets in the economy. To answer
the second question, about possible reform of the law clerk market, we
describe some of the unique features of this market that make reform
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particularly challenging and consider whether there are ways to adapt the
reforms that have succeeded in other markets to these unique features.
Federal judicial clerkships represent an important point of entry to
many of the most sought-after positions in the legal profession. Every year top
students from elite law schools compete for positions with judges who can
help them to land Supreme Court clerkships, plum teaching jobs, and
competitive law firm positions. 1 At the same time, federal judges depend
heavily on their law clerks to aid them with their workload. 2
The essential problem with how this important market presently
functions is that it is difficult to establish the time at which the market will
operate. Any time that is set will tend to “unravel” because judges have an
incentive to “jump the gun,” hiring slightly earlier than their competitors, to
get the pick of the candidates. 3 Students have strong reasons to accept early
offers from judges, among other things because they will not know what their
other options may be and also because it is, quite simply, difficult and
uncomfortable to hold off a federal judge. Judge Kozinski explains the
incentive on the judge side: “From the judge’s perspective, making an early
offer allows him to … attract candidates who might not otherwise seriously
consider him for a clerkship.”4 “[T]he ability to make offers early” is “a very
important bargaining tool.”5 As described by one respondent to our survey of
federal appellate judges:
I live in, and my office is located in, a country town . .
. . [I]t is not every young man or woman who will come here
to live; indeed, most won’t. . . .
[Initially] I did not employ law clerks until they had
finished the first term of their senior year of law school. . . . I
soon found out that it was more and more difficult to get law
clerks from the top of the class. . . . But I have found that there
are a few people in the top of the class at most law schools
who had rather be assured of a job early, even in a town this
size, than to wait and enter the contest in becoming clerks for
judges in the larger cities with the larger and better-advertised
1

See generally Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J.
1707, 1709 (1991) (describing judges’ influence over clerks’ future career
trajectories).
2
See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152,
153 (1990).
3
See Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and
Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AMER. ECON.
REV. 992, 992 (1994).
4
Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1720.
5
Id. at 1710.
2

reputations. 6
The result of this incentive for jumping the gun is a situation in which
judges scheme to out- maneuver one another in the effort to hire desirable
clerks. Judges accuse their colleagues of “frequenting maternity wards to make
sure they get the ‘best’ clerks.”7 The frenzy of hiring has cast the judiciary into
disrepute in some eyes—a concern that judges have often voiced over the
years, and a concern that is dramatically confirmed by some of the striking
stories told by students in response to our surveys. The process by which
clerks are hired has other negative consequences as well, as we describe
below.
Part I of our analysis provides a normative framework within which to
analyze the market for federal judicial law clerks. There is a complicated
economics literature on the efficiency of hiring in markets with timing
problems; we attempt to distill the essential components of this literature,
which have not been reflected in the existing legal literature on the law clerk
market, and we highlight some special features of the economics literature that
bear on law clerk hiring specifically. Our normative framework provides a
context within which to view our empirical results.
A fundamental goal of our project has been to gain an improved
understanding of how the market for federal judicial law clerks actually
operates. There are many rumors and opinions about this market, and few hard
facts. To remedy the lack of systematic knowledge, we have surveyed both
judges (including Supreme Court Justices) and students about the law clerk
hiring process. The little empirical work that presently exists is quite dated
(particularly in this rapidly changing market) and also is much less
comprehensive than our effort.8 We use our results to present a broad
empirical picture of the market from both judges’ and students’ perspective.
Part II describes our empirical findings. On the judge side, we
surveyed all federal appellate judges in both 1999 and 2000 and received
responses from two-thirds of the judges in 1999 and from 54% of them in
2000. This gives us a reasonably comprehensive picture of the law clerk
market as viewed from the judge side. We also sought the input of the nine
6

1999 Judge Survey #26d. For details on our citation practices for survey
responses, see infra Part II.B.
7
Abner J. Mikva, Judicial Clerkships: A Judge’s View, 36 J. LEGAL ED.
150, 152 (1986).
8
A survey of judges was conducted in the early 1990s, as was a survey of
law students. See Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer & Guido Calabresi,
The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1
Solution, 104 YALE L.J. 207 (1994) (judge survey); Lynn K. Rhinehart, Is
There Gender Bias in the Judicial Law Clerk Selection Process, 83 GEO. L.J.
575 (1994) (student survey).
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Justices of the United States Supreme Court and received responses from eight
of them. On the student side, we conducted surveys in 1999 and again in 2000
about the hiring process. Our results provide a window on how the hiring
process is regarded by applicants, how well students are being matched to
judges, and how the process is affecting students’ decisions to apply for
clerkships.
Part III looks at other markets that have had difficulty in establishing
the timing of transactions. Markets with such timing problems can be found in
a wide range of settings; they include markets for athletic tournaments,
markets for medical residents, and markets for social club memberships. Part
III attempts to distill from the existing economics literature what has been
learned from the extensive study of this other set of markets.
Part IV tackles the question of what, if anything, should be done in
the market fo r federal judicial law clerks. The main possibilities, in their
rough contours, are familiar from the existing legal literature: 1) Leave the
hiring process unregulated (as at present); 2) Establish start dates for offers
and perhaps also interviews (a strategy that has been tried in the law clerk
market on numerous past occasions); and 3) Institute some form of
centralized matching of judges and clerks. The last approach is the one
presently used in the market for medical residency positions (as well as in a
variety of other markets), and one of the present authors (Roth) was
responsible for the design of the centralized matching process presently used
for medical residencies. 9
Because of the diversity of opinion expressed in the existing literature
and in our surveys on the matter of reform, we will not try to focus on any one
of these three approaches. Rather we shall attempt to describe, in light of the
evidence and insights presented in Parts I through III, how each of these
approaches could best be imp lemented; we will then assess its likelihood of
success in light of what we know from our evidence and the experience of
other markets. Of the possibilities we consider, the most promising appears to
be the use of a centralized matching process for the limited set of federal
appellate clerkships that may feed into Supreme Court clerkships, with
enforcement of the centralized matching requirement by the Supreme Court.
We describe this proposal in more detail in Part IV.C below.
I. A Normative Framework
A natural prerequisite for assessing whether what is happening in the
market for federal judicial law clerks is good or bad is a set of normative
9

See Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, The Redesign of the Matching
Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic
Design, 89 AMER. ECON. REV. 748 (1999).
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criteria against which to make that assessment. We begin with the concern
most often voiced by judges—that the current process casts the bench into
disrepute. We then turn to the question of the efficiency and perceived fairness
of the current process of law clerk hiring.
Throughout the discussion it is important to distinguish between two
separate, although related, features of the market for law clerks. The first is
that hiring tends to occur in a rough-and-tumble manner, with judges making
short- fuse offers, trying to out-maneuver each other, and so forth. The second,
distinct feature is that hiring tends to occur very early in the student’s law
school career. These two things are related in important ways, of course, but
for our normative analysis it is important to distinguish between them. 10
Throughout our discussion we focus on the market for federal, and
especially federal appellate, judicial clerkships. We adopt this focus because
the market for federal, and particularly federal appellate, clerkships is the
market in which most of the problems with which we are concerned have
arisen.
A. Disillusionment with the federal bench.
From judges’ perspective, the biggest concern with the current state
of the law clerk market seems to be the disrepute cast upon the bench by the
way in which hiring is done. (Judges are also likely to care about some of the
other problems we describe below.) Indeed, the impetus for one of the prior
reform efforts was an article in The New York Times that painted a colorful
picture of the judicial “free for all” that occurred as judges “behav[ed] like 6year-olds” in the “scramble” to hire law clerks. 11 One judge likened the
process to a “calf scramble,” which is “the low point of many western rodeos.
A small number of calves are turned loose in the arena, along with a larger
number of adolescent cow persons. The latter attempt to seize, subdue, and
carry out the former. The SPCA writes letters to the editor during the
following week.”12 (Presumably the “adolescent cow persons” here are the
judges.)
The “judicial disrepute” normative perspective on the law clerk
market is relatively simple. A system in which hiring occurred in an orderly
and respectable manner would be preferable to a system that can be likened
10

See generally Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen, Unraveling in Matching Markets,
88 AMER. ECON. REV. 371, 372 (1998) (discussing the distinction between
strategic behavior in transactions and how early the transactions occur).
11
See Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 209-10 (quoting David
Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, with
Judicial Decorum Left in the Dust, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1989, at B4).
12
Id. at 210 (quoting Judge Alfred T. Goodwin).
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to a “calf scramble.” The fact that hiring occurs early in the students’ law
school careers might not be an independent problem on this view; rather it
may be merely a symptom of the other problem—that judges are jockeying
for position and trying to out-maneuver one another in the competition for
the best law clerks.
Other normative criteria turn out to be more complex, as we shall see.
B. Efficiency.
From an economist’s perspective, the natural question to ask about
the market for federal judicial law clerks is whether it is efficient. Markets
normally give some promise of efficiency if they allow participants to
compare the alternatives available in the marketplace. Thus one potential
source of inefficiency in the law clerk market is that the “calf scramble”
forces judges and students to make choices before they can make real
comparisons. A second (related but distinct) potential cause of inefficiency is
the early date at which hiring takes place. If the quality of the match between
judge and clerk depends on attributes that are not adequately predicted by
information available after the first year of law school (and would be better
predicted by a student’s full law school record), then hiring may be occurring
at an inefficiently early time. 13
We elaborate on these issues below, considering them in the light of
several different possible standards of efficiency.
1. Pareto efficiency.
One standard is Pareto efficiency, which says that an outcome is
efficient as long as there is no way to make one or more parties better off
without making at least one person worse off. Under this standard, the market
for federal judicial law clerks is likely to be efficient. The Pareto standard is
notoriously weak, for rarely can one make some people better off without
13

Note that salaries are highly regulated in this market. For recent analyses
of matching in contexts where salaries are flexible, see Hao Li & Wing Suen,
Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1058 (2000),
and Wing Suen, A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching, 31 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2000). For a
discussion of relaxing salary restrictions in the market for federal judicial law
clerks, see Edward S. Adams, A Market-Based Solution to the Judicial
Clerkship Selection Process, 59 Md. L. Rev. 129, 167-72 (2000). However,
many of the inefficiency results apply both to matching with fixed salaries and
to matching with flexible salaries. See, e.g., Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at
1034-35 (theorem 2).
6

making even a single person worse off. 14
To be sure, it is possible that the law clerk market is suboptimal for all
participants. It may be that some participants jump the gun because they hope
to gain an advantage over the others, but in doing so they create a negative
externality for the others that forces them to move early also. In this case it can
happen that all participants would be better off if hiring occurred in an orderly
manner, at a later time, or both. 15 But it seems more likely that some gunjumping judges would be made worse off by such a reform, since they would
no longer have the bargaining advantage that they seek to get from jumping
the gun. (Certainly Judge Kozinski’s view in his well-known article
Confessions of a Bad Apple16 is that such reform would make him worse off.)
Thus, the remainder of our analysis will consider two other, more
useful conceptions of “efficiency.”
2. Maximizing the “sum total of satisfaction” of judges and clerks
with the match.
If the standard of efficiency is not Pareto efficiency but instead some
broader notion of maximizing something like “the sum total of the
satisfaction” (however measured) of judges and students with their matches,
where some parties’ gains can be traded off against others’ losses, then several
arguments suggest that the current market is likely to be inefficient. We first
consider the nature of the process and the n the distinct issue of the early time
at which hiring is done.
a. The nature of the process.
“[M]uch of the benefit of a market has to do with bringing together
many buyers and sellers at the same time, so that they can consider a wide
range of possible transactions.”17 But in the present state of the market for
federal judicial law clerks, the buyers (of clerks’ services) and sellers (of those
services) typically can consider very few possible transactions. Indeed, in
many instances the sellers can consider only one possible transaction—the one
with the judge who first makes them an offer, as we detail in Part II below.
Why are many of the gains of a market lost when participants are not
able to consider a range of options? Unlike in a well- functioning market,
judges and students are not able to gather information about multiple options
14

See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 193
(1980).
15
See Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 10034-35 & Appendix.
16
Kozinski, supra note 1.
17
Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 992.
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and then act on that information to seek out their most preferred alternatives.
Choices must be made from a very small set of alternatives and in a very
compressed period. Decisions must be reached on the basis of extremely
limited information. And participants must consider not only how much they
like each potential match, but how much the potential partner likes them,
because time spent in ultimately fruitless courtship (for instance, in making an
offer that is subsequently refused) means that other candidates will have
matched and left the market. All of these features have the potential to
introduce substantial inefficiency. 18 In addition, this process may be so
unappealing to some judges and clerks that they drop out of the process
altogether.
b. Early hiring.
The costs of a rough-and-tumble process exist whatever the timing of
hiring; even if such a process occurred at the middle or the end of students’
third year of law school, the inability of participants to consider a range of
options would reduce the ordinary gains from a well- functioning market. The
fact that hiring also occurs very early in students’ law school career poses a
distinct set of problems. These are mostly related to the limited amount of
information that will be available when hiring is done early (wholly apart from
the informational limitations that result from a chaotic process).
As will be described more fully in Part II, almost two-thirds of the
federal appellate judges responding to our survey about the most recent law
clerk hiring season were entirely done with their hiring by January 31 of the
applicants’ second year of law school. (As noted in Part II.B.3.c, a few
students apply for clerkships in their third year, but this is a relatively small
number.) Thus decisions for the typical judge were based solely on first-year
grades and recommendations (since first-semester second-year grades would
not yet be available), together with the student’s record prior to law school.
The problem with such early hiring is that two-thirds of the
information about the student’s academic record in law school, plus virtually
all of the information about the student’s legal writing, which typically is done
in the second and third years, is missing. Obviously assessing the impact of
this missing information on the satisfaction of judges and students with their
matches is difficult. Is the quality of a student’s legal writing well-predicted by
the student’s first-year grades? Are second- and third-year grades wellpredicted by first-year grades?
18

Such inefficiency is examined in simulations motivated by the market for
clinical psychologists in Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Turnaround Time
and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market
for Clinical Psychologists, 105 J. POL. ECON. 284 (1997).
8

It is (for obvious reasons) not very easy to get data on grades, but we
do have data from a relatively recent Harvard Law School class, comparing
first-year GPA to the overall GPA for all three years. The overlap between the
two measures in the top of the class is not small, but neither are the
discrepancies. Of the students who were in the top 25 (of a class of
approximately 550) at the end of the first year, 15 were in the top 25 at the end
of the third year. The other 10 who were in the top 25 of their first year class
were (in order of decreasing class rank) 29th, 30th 33rd, 38th, 42nd, 48th,
58th, 62nd, 67th, and 72nd at the end of the third year. The students who were
ranked 42nd, 43rd, 48th, 49th, 69th, and 75th would almost certainly not have
been competitive for the top clerkships had they held those positions in class
rank after the first year. The students who took these 10 students’ place in the
top 25 by the end of the third year were ranked (again in order of decreasing
rank) 26th, 29th, 32nd, 33rd, 42nd, 43rd, 48th, 49th, 69th, and 75th at the end
of the first year. Probably the last six of these did not have a shot at the best
clerkships based on their first year grades, even though they finished their law
school careers comfortably within the top 5% of their class at Harvard Law
School. (Indeed, one of these six students ended up graduating 4th in the
class.)
In short, early hiring seems to create a real risk of mismatches in both
directions: some students hired for the most competitive clerkships on the
basis of first-year standing may prove to be less strong than judges had hoped,
and some of the most competitive students may not be identifiable on the basis
of first-year grades. It is true that large law firms likewise hire for second-year
summer positions—which may turn into permanent positions—on the basis of
first-year grades, but since law firms have a large range of types of work
(ranging from the relatively mundane to the complex), and because they hire a
large number of associates each year (versus a small number of clerks in the
judicial setting), and because decisions about permanent jobs are made in
significant part based on summer performance, errors are likely to be both less
serious and less frequent in this market than in the law clerk market.
In assessing the power of first-year grades to predict second- and thirdyear grades, it should be noted that one cannot be sure what second- and thirdyear grades would look like if clerkships were not decided before these grades
are handed out. One possibility is that students who do not receive clerkships
(or who, having received mediocre first-year grades, know that they will not
receive clerkships) may throw in the towel and stop trying. Another possibility
is that students who get clerkships may decide that their future is set and thus
that they need not try any more. Either phenomenon would distort second- and
third-year grades relative to first-year grades; second- and third-year grades
would be a less clear measure of “legal ability.” They may also be a less clear
measure because of strategic course selection by students. A thought
provoking implication of these suggestions is that judges who wait longer to
hire their clerks may be “fooled” by the high second- and third-year grades of
9

those not hired earlier, as those grades may be artificially inflated by less
exertion of effort by students who receive clerkships early and by strategic
course selection. But in fact slacking off and strategic course selection by
students who do not get clerkships seem more likely; students who get
clerkships, or at least students who get the most prestigious clerkships, are
likely to care about grades for other reasons (graduation honors, Supreme
Court clerkships, positions in legal academia), which will give them reason not
to slack off.
Early hiring does not impose unambiguous costs on the parties. While
less information will be available, risk-averse parties will enjoy some benefit
from resolving uncertainty earlier and, in effect, insuring themselves against
the possibility that things will turn out badly for them. 19 (For students, things
could turn out badly if their law school careers do not progress in the way they
might hope; for judges, things could turn out badly if they end up being
unattractive to students for some reason.) The economics literature on
matching shows that with risk-averse parties, early hiring may sometimes
create benefits. 20 But in other similar contexts we do not seem to think that
early transactions for insurance purposes produce a better outcome; for
instance, no one argues that students should be admitted to college based on
sixth- grade test scores in order to “insure” students against not turning out as
well as they might hope or colleges against being less attractive than they
might otherwise be. It is equally unclear why such insurance would on balance
be desirable in the clerkship setting.
3. Maximizing the “production of justice.”
Until now the efficiency discussion has focused on the well-being of
the parties to the clerkship match—judges and students. The emphasis has
been on achieving “good,” or desirable, matches from their perspective.
Another conception of efficiency focuses on the overall quality of the legal
system—whether the law clerk market maximizes the “production of justice”
(however defined). This question can be rephrased: Is failing to match the
most desired clerkship candidates to the most desired judges—that is, failing to
match in accordance with the parties’ preferences—a bad thing or a good thing
from the perspective of maximizing the “production of justice”?
If the quality of judicial output is an additive function of judges’ and
clerks’ ability, then the matching does not matter, holding constant the
aggregate pool of clerks hired. If, instead, the output quality of relatively less
desired judges benefits from the input of top clerks more than the output
quality of relatively more desired judges does, then “mismatches” are actually
19
20

See Li & Rosen, supra note 10.
See id.
10

good for societal welfare. Finally, if the quality of judicial output is a
multiplicative function of judges’ ability (measured by attractiveness to
applicants) and clerks’ ability, then “mismatches” are likely to reduce societal
welfare. There are other factors as well; for instance, a top law clerk may
benefit more from the coaching of a more desirable judge, and this may
produce broader benefits for society as the clerk goes out and pursues his or
her own career. A further effect may be that the matching process may affect
students’ incentives to put in effort to become able in the first place. All in all,
it turns out to be quite difficult to say how mismatches affect the overall
quality of the legal system. For this reason, we give primary emphasis below
to the criterion of maximizing the satisfaction of judges and clerks with the
match.
C. Perceived fairness.
Judges and students may care not only about the match that results
from the law clerk hiring process but also about the nature of the experience
itself. Even if Judge A and student B are quite happy to be paired with one
another at the end of the road, if the process of getting to that point was
unpleasant, the market may still cause disutility and, thus, may be suboptimal.
We have already discussed judges’ distaste for the law clerk hiring
process. (See section A.) Our survey results suggest that students may have
similar or even stronger feelings. We focus below on a particular form of
disutility on students’ part: since it is hard for participants in this market to get
good information about one another, various forms of personal wellconnectedness may come to play a large role, and students (as well as judges)
may perceive this to be unfair. We discuss evidence along these lines in Part II.
II. Empirical Results
A. A brief history of the law clerk market.
To understand the story told by our empirical evidence from judges
and students, it is helpful first to understand what has gone before. The history
of the market for federal judicial law clerks and the attempts to reform it have
been described well and fully by others, so we offer only the barest essentials
here. 21
Over the past several decades, the time of hiring of law clerks has
moved from the end of the third year of law school to the beginning or
middle of the second year. Judge Wald writes of her experience, “I was hired
in 1951 as a clerk to Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank in May of my third
21

For a full account through 1994, see Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra
note 8, at 208-221.
11

year.”22 During the most recent hiring season, by contrast, the process was
well underway by mid- fall of the second year, as documented in Part
III.C.1.b below.
Each stage in the backward progression in the time of hiring of
federal judicial law clerks has been marked by a belief that the market will
never move earlier than the present moment—that the process has reached a
“natural stopping point” beyond which it will not move. Judge Kozinski,
writing in 1991, provides an example:
[T]he breakpoint for many judges in making clerkship
decisions comes around February or March of a student’s
second year of law school. At that time several things come to
pass. Perhaps most important, the student’s third semester
grades become available. Also, many students will have
developed relationships with members of the faculty by
working as research assistants, participating in individual
research projects, writing papers or participating in seminars.
By that time as well, students will have had a fair opportunity
to show commitment to their law reviews by participating in
the editing process or doing substantial work toward
publication of their comments. For those of us who care about
such things—and there are many—law review board elections
are conducted around that time. 23
Of course, hiring has now moved to a point well before Judge Kozinski’s
“breakpoint.”
The past two decades have witnessed a parade of attempted reforms of
the market for federal judicial law clerks. These reforms have had in common
their inability to solve the problem. The average life of a reform has been
about three years. 24 The latest reform effort, begun in 1993, involved the
imposition of a March 1 start date and initially appeared promising to its
sponsors, who stated hopefully after its first year of operation that although
“[w]e entertain no illusions that the March 1 Solution is perfect, . . . we
respectfully submit that, like democracy with all its flaws, it is the best system
that anyone has conceived thus far.”25 However, it was this very reform that
the Judicial Conference abandoned in 1998 after an acknowledgement that it
was “not universally followed and, therefore, … not an accurate reflection of
22

See Wald, supra note 2, at 155.
Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1710.
24
See Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 209-15 (describing five
failed reform efforts over the period from 1978 to 1991); infra text
accompanying note 87 (describing the abandonment of the sixth, most recent
reform attempt, begun in 1993, in September of 1998).
25
Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 222.
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the practice in the courts.”26
Thus, for the last two years, there has been no official Judicial
Conference policy governing the hiring of federal judicial law clerks. In the
first year after the abandonment of the March 1 start date, some law schools
attempted to enforce a February 1 start date for sending application materials,
including faculty recommendations, to judges, but these efforts were largely
abandoned the following year (as well as somewhat ignored in the year in
which they were nominally in effect). To learn more about what is presently
happening in the market for federal judicial law clerks, we surveyed both
judges and students about the process.
B. Survey design and response.
1. Survey of Supreme Court Justices.
In October of 1999 we sent a letter to the nine active Supreme Court
Justices asking about their law clerk hiring practices and how these might
relate to the hiring practices of other federal judges. The letter came from the
judge author of the present work (Posner) and promised confidentiality to the
Justices. Eight of the nine members of the Court responded. We discuss their
responses in connection with our analysis of possible reforms of the law clerk
market and the potential role of the Supreme Court in enforcing these reforms.
2. Surveys of Court of Appeals judges.
In September of 1999 and again in June of 2000 we distributed a
survey about law clerk hiring to all federal Court of Appeals judges. The judge
author of this article (Posner) mailed the surveys to all active and senior
judges. 27 For confidentiality reasons we requested that the judges return their
responses to another of us (Jolls) rather than to him; also, we did not ask for
respondents’ names, but we did ask for the judge’s court (First Circuit, Second
Circuit, etc.) and the general timeframe in which the judge was appointed, and
from this information it would be possible to identify some judges. We
therefore assured judges that identifying information would be shielded from
the judge author of this work as well as kept confidential from the public at
large. The 1999 and 2000 surveys were quite similar, although the 2000
version included a few new questions.

26

Official Report of the Sept. 1998 Meeting of the Judicial Conference of the
United States.
27
A small number of senior Court of Appeals judges from the Seventh
Circuit were not surveyed because the sender of the survey (Posner), a Judge
on that Circuit, knew that they were no longer hiring law clerks.
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The 1999 survey yielded 155 responses from judges, a 65% response
rate. Of the responses, 103 were from active judges, while 51 were from senior
judges (one respondent did not specify seniority). This is almost an exact
match to the overall proportion of active judges versus senior judges on the
bench (161 active, 77 senior), as shown in Table A1 in the attached Data
Appendix. The 2000 survey yielded a similar, although slightly lower,
response rate of 54%, perhaps because some judges were disinclined to bother
responding a second time. Again the pattern of responses from active and
senior judges (84 and 45 responses respectively) was almost an exact match to
the overall proportion of active judges versus senior judges on the bench
(again see Table A1). Across individual circuits there was somewhat greater,
although not enormous, variation in the response rates, as summarized in Table
A1. All surveys that were returned to us were assigned numbers, and these are
what we use to identify particular responses that we quote or rely upon.
As is obvious from the description just given, our judge data embrace
only federal appellate judges; they do not include information on federal
District Court judges. While it is true that some of the most elite federal
District Court judges probably compete with federal Court of Appeals judges
for clerks, the number of such plausible competitors is sufficiently limited,
relative to the overall size of the pool of federal District Court judges, to justify
the limitation of the distribution of our survey to federal appellate judges.
3. Surveys of students.
In surveying students about the law clerk market, we faced a scope
problem similar to, although vastly greater in magnitude than, the problem
faced for judges. Having decided to focus on federal appellate judges, our
interest on the student side was in students who were potential candidates for
clerkships with such judges. At some level, though, that group includes every
law student in the country, since students serving in federal appellate
clerkships hail from an extraordinary number of schools ranging from Detroit
Mercy to St. John’s University to Louisiana State to Harvard.28 Because it was
obviously impracticable to survey every student at every law school in the
country, we were forced to make choices about how to narrow the group. One
approach, which was the approach taken in the only existing survey of
clerkship candidates of which we are aware, is to limit the sample to students
serving on the main law review at one of some suitably defined set of “very
good” schools (say, schools in the top ten or twenty). 29 The second approach,
which is the one we adopted, involves surveying all students, not just members
of the main law review, at an even smaller number of schools.
28

See Judicial Yellow Book, Spring 2000, at 52, 58, 81, 83 (listing these
schools as the alma mater of federal appellate clerks).
29
See Rhinehart, supra note 8, at 577-78 & n.12.
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Two empirical factors support our focus on all students, not just
members of the main law review, at a smaller number of schools. First,
membership in a school’s main law review does not appear to be of overriding
or even particularly great importance in the selection process of Court of
Appeals judges. Our 2000 judge survey asked judges to rank the following
eight factors in order of their importance to the judges’ law clerk hiring
decisions: law school grades, recommendations from familiar professors,
recommendations from other professors, recommendations from past legal
employers, recommendations from current clerks and other “peers,”
membership in the school’s main law review, board position at the school’s
main law review, and writing sample. (We did not ask judges to rank the
importance of the personal interview because it seemed likely to be of
substantial importance to almost all of them.) Table A2 in the Data Appendix
summarizes the rankings given to membership in the school’s main law
review. Over half of the judges who provided rankings (55 of 109; seven
judges simply indicated that such membership was a factor without specifying
its importance) said that membership in the main law review was either in the
bottom half of factors in terms of importance or was not a factor in their
decisions at all. Only six judges said that such membership was the most
important of the eight factors to their decisions.
The second empirical factor that supports looking at all law students
at a smaller number of schools as opposed to only members of the main law
review at a larger number of schools is that students from the four law
schools generally considered to be the most competitive (Chicago, Harvard,
Stanford, and Yale in alphabetical order) strongly dominate students from the
remaining top ten and top twenty schools in their success in landing federal
appellate clerkships. (For the top ten and the top twenty lists, we use the
(admittedly controversial) U.S. News and World Report rankings. Harvard,
Stanford, and Yale are the top three schools according to this ranking;
Chicago is sixth.)
Table A3 in the Data Appendix presents the number of students from
each group of schools serving in federal appellate clerkships according to
data from the most recent edition of the Judicial Yellow Book. It is important
to emphasize at the outset the limitations of these data: they cover only those
judges who choose to report their clerks’ schools (approximately one-third
do not report), and, much more importantly, the variations in reporting rates
across circuits are substantial. As a result of the latter point, the numbers in
Table A3 are probably understated (relatively speaking) for the California
schools, including Stanford, as well as the Universities of Pennsylvania and
Texas, and probably overstated for Chicago, New York University, and
Columbia; the reason is that the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits (covering
Pennsylvania, Texas, and California respectively) have (along with the
Eighth Circuit) the lowest rates of coverage in the Judicial Yellow Book (with
percentages ranging from 42% to 63%), while the Second and Seventh
15

Circuits (covering New York and Chicago respectively) have much higher
coverage rates (81% for the Second Circuit, 87% for the Seventh Circuit).
Despite the limitations of the Judicial Yellow Book data, Table A3,
coupled with the information in Table A2, provides support for the approach
of looking comprehensively at the very top tier of schools instead of looking
only at members of the main law review at a somewhat broader set of
institutions. Students from Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale held 143
clerkships (an average of 36 per school), compared to 93 for students from
the next six schools (an average of 16 per school) and 68 for students from
the remaining ten of the top twenty institutions (an average of 7 per school).
Note that what is relevant for our purposes is the absolute representation of
the schools, not how they fare relative to their student body sizes, since our
goal is to get information from the largest absolute number of potential
federal appellate law clerks.
The remainder of this section provides further detail on how we
conducted our student surveys.
a. 2000 survey of second-year students.
In February of 2000 we distributed surveys about the 1999-2000 law
clerk hiring process to all second- year students at Chicago, Harvard,
Stanford, and Yale. Surveys were placed in student mailboxes, and students
were provided with a stamped, pre-addressed envelope in which to return
their responses to one of us (Jolls). Students were assured that no potentially
identifying information in their responses would be revealed publicly or even
to the judge author of this work. Students were not asked to put their names
on their responses.
We received a total of 294 responses, a 26% response rate.
Presumably the lower response rate for students than for federal appellate
judges reflected the fact that while almost all appellate judges hire law
clerks, many law students do not apply for federal appellate clerkships. We
received 129 responses from students who applied for federal appellate
clerkships (and 165 from students who did not; students were asked to return
the survey either way), but since we do not know the actual number of
students who applied for these positions, we cannot calculate a response rate
for the 129 responses. As with the judge surveys, all 2000 second- year
student surveys returned to us were assigned numbers, which are used to
identify the surveys below.
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b.

1999 survey of second-year students

In March of 1999 we distributed surveys to all second- year students
at the four law schools surveyed in 2000 and also to all second- year students
at three additional schools, Columbia, Michigan, and Vanderbilt. In contrast
to the 2000 student survey, which sought mostly quantitative or categorical
information (for instance, “in what month did you apply?”, “how many
interviews did you do?”), the 1999 survey was largely anecdotal, with mostly
open-ended essay or long-answer questions. This survey, administered just as
our project was getting underway, provided a natural starting point for our
research.
The survey was distributed by multiple means. At schools other than
Harvard, it was left in students’ mailboxes with instructions to return
responses to a drop box at a specified location; at some of these schools the
survey was also distributed via electronic mail. At Harvard the survey was
left in students’ mailboxes, again with instructions to return responses to a
drop box; in addition some students received copies of the survey in their
large “bundled” classes. As with the 2000 survey, students were not asked
for their names and were assured of the confidentiality of any possibly
identifying information. 30
We received a total of 337 responses to the 1999 survey. Table A4 in
the Data Appendix provides a breakdown by school and by whether the
respondent applied for federal judicial clerkships. (In 1999 we asked whether
the student had applied for federal judicial clerkships, appellate or trial level;
in 2000 we asked whether the student had applied for federal appellate
clerkships specifically. Also, for 2000 we do not have data by school because
one school objected to having school identification on the survey in 2000.) In
the interest of consistency with the 2000 results, we focus our analysis of the
1999 data on the four schools surveyed in 2000; thus information from the
1999 surveys reported below is from the surveys distributed at Chicago,
Harvard, Stanford, and Yale. These schools accounted for 267 of the 337
responses (79%) (see Table A4). As above, we assigned an identifying
number to each response.
As just noted, our 2000 survey of second-year students asked whether
the student had applied for federal appellate clerkships, and only students who
had done so were directed to fill out the body of the survey; the 1999 survey
asked whether the student had applied for federal appellate or trial level
clerkships, and only those who had done so were directed to fill out the body
of the survey. In both cases, however, some of the responses by students in the
30

At the time of the 1999 student survey, one of us (Posner) had not yet
become involved in the project. We interpreted the confidentiality promise to
students as requiring that no one other than the original three authors (Avery,
Jolls, and Roth) see any potentially identifying information.
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body of the survey may relate to state court applications or (for the 2000
survey) federal trial level applications, even though those were not embraced
in the opening question, because the students may have applied for those
positions in addition to the ones embraced in the opening question. Obviously
we could have chosen to limit subsequent questions (such as “When was your
first interview?”, “When was your first offer of a clerkship?”, and “Did you
receive other clerkship offers before you rejected your first offer?”) to the
category of clerkships embraced in the opening question, but this could have
produced misleading or incomplete answers, since other opportunities
certainly might have affected the student’s situation in the market for the
clerkships covered in the opening question. Nonetheless, the cost of our
approach is that the data presented below, while only for students who applied
for some sort of federal clerkship—and for 2000 only for students who applied
for federal appellate clerkships—may reflect events in other markets as well.
c. The role of third-year students.
There is a widespread perception (which we shared prior to receiving
the contrary results from our judge survey) that the early time at which
clerkship hiring occurs has significantly increased the frequency of hiring of
third- year students, making our focus on second-year students potentially
problematic. Dean Anthony Kronman of Yale Law School wrote to the Yale
student body about the subject of third- year applications in the fall of 1999,
saying that he “suspect[ed] that third-year applications will become
increasingly routine” and that he “regard[ed] this development as a healthy
one.”31 Students would work at a law firm or pursue some other opportunity
for a year after finishing law school and then begin a clerkship.
The responses to our judge survey suggest, however, that judges have
not intensified their hiring of third- year students in response to the
developments in the clerkship market since the 1998 abandonment of the
March 1 start date. In our 2000 judge survey we asked how many third- year
students, and also how many post-graduates (candidates who had finished
law school), judges hired in 1999-2000 and whether these numbers were
greater than, less than, or the same as the numbers in previous years.
Answers are presented in Table A5 in the Data Appendix. No discernible
trend toward increased hiring of third- year students (or post- graduates)
appears in this data.

31

Memorandum from Anthony Kronman to the students of Yale Law
School, Dec. 8, 1999.
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C. Is the law clerk market functioning well?
Our survey results allow us to assess the functioning of the market for
federal judicial law clerks within the normative framework developed in Part I
above. We first discuss findings related to the efficiency of the clerk hiring
process and then turn to findings that bear on disillusionment with the federal
bench and the perceived fairness of the clerk hiring process.
1. Efficiency: Maximizing the “sum of satisfaction” of judges and
clerks with the match.
Part I.B above discussed two separate efficiency criteria for assessing the
workings of the law clerk market: maximizing the “sum of satisfaction” of
judges and clerks with the match, and maximizing the “production of justice.”
Our survey results do not shed light on the second criterion (which we
concluded was less useful in any event), but they have much to say about the
first.
a. The nature of the process.
We first consider the ways in which the nature of the law clerk hiring
process impedes maximizing the “sum of satisfaction” of judges and clerks
with the match. The biggest problem is that, as noted above, the process does
not permit judges and clerks to consider a range of alternatives before making
their decisions.
Our survey results provide strong quantitative evidence of the inability
to consider a range of options on both sides of this market. The results show in
a systematic way how the clerkship market resolves extraordinarily quickly,
with judges and students pairing off in an almost frenetic fashion to avoid
being left in the cold. The basic chronology, as described more fully below, is
that
•

interviews lead very quickly to offers (section i below);

•

offers produce very quick responses (section ii);

•

responses are generally acceptances (section iii); and

•

many scheduled interviews are canceled as a result (section iv).

Thus, students and judges tend to pair off quickly with those with whom they
have early interviews. As a result,
•

many students limit the judges to whom they apply to avoid being
paired off early with a less preferred judge (section v); and

•

at least some students who might otherwise be interested in
19

clerking avoid the process entirely (section vi).
i. First step: interviews lead quickly to offers.
The time between interviews and offers is typically very short, as revealed
by responses to our 2000 survey of second-year students. (We did not ask
about the gap between interview and offer times in our 1999 survey.) As
shown in Table 1, over half of students’ first offers of clerkships were made
within two days of the offering judge’s interview of the student; 34% were
made at the conclusion of the interview.
Table 1: Length of Time Between First Offer and
Interview with the Offering Judge, 1999-2000
Time between first offer and interview with the offering
judge
Offer made at end of interview
1-2 days elapsed between interview and offer
3-4 days elapsed between interview and offer
5-7 days elapsed between interview and offer
1-2 weeks elapsed between interview and offer
More than 2 weeks elapsed between interview and offer

Percent of
responding
students
34%
23%
9%
15%
8%
11%

Total number of responses: 101a
Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey.
a
2000 Second-Year Survey #23 did not answer the question about the time elapsed
between the student’s first offer and the interview with the offering judge, even
though this student reported receiving an offer of a clerkship. Therefore we have 101
responses for this question, versus 102 responses for a number of the questions
discussed below.

Moreover, our survey results show that the judge who makes the
student’s first offer typically comes early in the student’s interview schedule,
as reported in Table 2. In other words, it is not ordinarily the case that students
interview with a range of judges and then receive their first offer. As the table
shows, 59% of first offers came from the first or second judge with whom the
student interviewed, and 36% came from the first judge with whom the student
interviewed.
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Table 2: Interview Producing First Offer, 1999-2000
Interviewing producing first offer
First interview produced first offer
Second interview produced first offer
Third interview produced first offer
Fourth interview produced first offer
Fifth or subsequent interview produced first offer

Percent of responding
students a
36%
23%
19%
8%
15%

Total number of responses: 102
Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey.
a
Percentages in this column sum to 101% as a consequence of rounding.

Responses to our judge surveys in 1999 and 2000 also suggest limited
time between interviews and offers. As Table 3 shows, approximately threequarters of active judges started making offers to candidates before they had
completed their scheduled interviews.
Table 3: The Practice of Making Offers Before
Completing Scheduled Interviews
Group of federal
appellate judges

All judges
Active judges
Senior judges
Senior status not listed

Percent of responding judges who began making
offers before completing their scheduled
interviews
1998-1999
1999-2000
64%
64%
74%
73%
38%
42%
0%
N/A
Total number of
responses:
138

Total number of
responses:
114

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

The reasons for the speed of offer behavior are not difficult to
understand. In both 1999 and 2000 we asked judges why they made offers
before completing interviews, and many of their explanations explicitly
mentioned the fear of losing candidates to other judges. In 1999, 76 of the 88
responding judges who started making offers before the completion of
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scheduled interviews offered reasons for this behavior, and 42% of those who
offered reasons specifically mentioned competition from other judges. These
judges’ specific responses are listed in Table A6 of the Data Appendix. The
situation in 2000 was similar; 54 of the 73 responding judges who had started
making offers before the completion of scheduled interviews gave their reason
for this choice, and one-third of those who offered reasons specifically
mentioned the fear of losing candidates to other judges. Again these judges’
specific responses are listed in Table A6. Putting both years together, only a
single judge mentioned the desire to save time (by not conducting further
interviews) as the reason for making offers before the completion of scheduled
interviews, while 50 gave competition from rivals as the reason. In response to
a different question on our judge survey, over half of responding judges in
both 1999 and 2000 said that competition influenced the time at which offers
were made, as reported in the top panel in Table 4 below. As described in
sections ii and iii below, offers typically lead to quick responses, which are
generally acceptances, so making an early offer tends to give a judge a
competitive edge.
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Table 4: Facts Abo ut Judges’ Motivations for Early Offers
Percent of responding judges
1998-1999
1999-2000
Competition influenced the time
at which offers were made
All judges
Active judges
Senior judges

An applicant requested that the
timetable be moved up a
All judges
Active judges
Senior judges

52%
59%
40%

53%
63%
30%

Total number of
responses:
140

Total number of
responses:
111

N/A
N/A
N/A

46%
53%
31%
Total number of
responses:
115

Timetable was moved up in
response to applicant’s requesta
All judges
Active judges
Senior judges

N/A
N/A
N/A

48%
48%
50%
Total number of
responses:
52

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
a
These questions were only asked in 2000.

In many instances, judges who made quick offers may have been
responding to explicit requests by students to speed up their timetables. Our
2000 judge survey showed that 53% of active judges reported that an applicant
had asked them to speed up the process because of a pending interview or offer
deadline from another judge, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 4. (We did
not ask a similar question in 1999.) Almost half of those who received such a
request moved up their timetables, also as shown in the bottom panel in Table
4.
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ii. Second step: offers lead quickly to responses.
Not only do interviews lead quickly to offers, but offers lead quickly
to responses; this is not a market in which students collect a substantial
number of offers and then make their decisions. As Table 5 shows, almost
three-quarters of students responded to their first offer of a clerkship within
two days of receiving the offer. (This information is from the 2000 survey.
We did not ask a parallel question in 1999.) Clearly this is a market in which
events move very quickly with little apparent time to consider multiple
options. Indeed, 42% of students responded to their first offer immediately.
Table 5: Timing of Student Response to First Clerkship Offer, 1999-2000
Time before
responding to first
offer
Immediate response
Within 2 days
3 days to 1 week
More than 1 week

Percent of responding students
(cumulative percentages in parenthesis)
42% (42%)
30% (71%)a
21% (92%)
8% (100%)

Total number of responses: 102
Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey.
a
The cumulative percentage of 71% does not equal the sum of 42%
and 30% as a consequence of rounding.

The reasons for the quick response times by students are again easy to
understand. Most obviously, many judges impose explicit response deadlines
at the time an offer is made. Among respondents to our 2000 judge survey,
25% reported requiring an answer within one day for one or more of their
slots. 38% reported requiring an answer within 48 hours, and 69% reported
requiring an answer within a week. These numbers are similar to, although
slightly higher than, the corresponding numbers from 1999, as shown on Table
6. (An earlier survey of judges by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts found still more dramatic results regarding the time to respond to
offers: “Almost one in six [judges] stated that students should have to respond
on the spot.”32 ) Student responses colorfully revealed the practice of limitedresponse-time offers, as shown in Table 7. At least one student attempted
unsuccessfully to gain additional time from a judge: “I asked for 24 hrs. to
consult my wife, but [the judge] said he couldn’t give me 24 hrs. I guaranteed

32

See Louis F. Oberdorfer & Michael N. Le vy, Clerkship Selection: A Reply
To The Bad Apple, 101 YALE L.J. 1097, 1102 n.18 (1992).
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him I would accept.”33
Table 6: Time -Limited Offers As Reported By Judges
Time within which
response to offer
required
Within 24 hours
Within 48 hours
Within a week

Percent of responding judges
1998-1999
1999-2000
22%
34%
67%

25%
38%
69%

Total number of
responses:
108

Total number of
responses:
85

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

33

1999 Student Survey #157.
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Table 7: Time -Limited Offers As Experienced By Students
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#154a

A Ninth Circuit judge in California made clerkship offers good for
only fifteen minutes.

1999 Survey
#105

[A particular judge] made an offer on the spot with no time to
decide.

1999 Survey
#159

[A particular judge] gave [me] 1.5 hours to decide after being
given an offer.

2000 Survey
#244

[A particular judge] wanted an answer on the spot.

1999 Survey
#118

[A particular judge] extended an offer only until the next morning.

1999 Survey
#108

[My] second choice judge g[a]ve an exploding offer on the phone
(i.e., I had to give an answer by the time I hung up) before [I was]
able to call/talk to my first choice judge.

2000 Survey
#247

I had to respond [to a particular judge’s offer] by the next
morning.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys.
a
This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written
about the market for federal judicial law clerks.

Even when an offer does not explicitly expire after only a very short
period, a variety of implicit pressures operate to press for a speedy response
by the student. To begin, some judges make offers to more candidates than
they have slots available, with the slots going to the first candidates to
accept. Not surprisingly, “[u]sually the clerk applicant accepts on the spot.”34
Interestingly, this sort of strategy is explicitly prohibited by the Harvard Law
School Office of Career Services for law firms interviewing Harvard Law
School students. 35

34

1999 Judge Survey #106. A similar strategy was used in hiring economics
professors at Ohio State University in 1970. The university “was authorized to
fill six positions, and it made offers to 11 candidates, saying that the offer
would remain open only until the first six acceptances were received.” Roth &
Xing, supra note 3, at 1036 n.78.
35
See Harvard Law School Office of Career Services 1999 Rules and
Regulations for Organizations Interviewing Harvard Law Students (“No offer
shall be made conditional upon a student’s accepting it before acceptances
have been received from other students to whom offers have also been
made.”).
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In addition, many students may feel the need to respond to an offer
quickly if they think there is some chance they would want to accept because
a delayed acceptance might start the relationship off on the wrong foot.
I had an offer from one judge that I had to respond to during a
short period of time, but I was still waiting to hear from my
top choice. My top choice called me half an hour before my
deadline with the other judge. I was worried that the first
judge would be offended that I waited so long to respond to
his offer. 36
[A particular judge] [m]entioned how, if he were to give an
offer to someone and they didn’t immediately accept, it would
make him wonder if he had made the right choice and
‘almost’ ma[k]e him want to withdraw it—but he said he
didn’t do that, said he might give a little time. 37
I was frustrated that my top choice judge hadn’t even started
interviewing when I got my offer. I felt my only choice was to
take the offer, as [I] couldn’t make the [offering] judge wait 2
weeks on the chance that I might get an offer [from the other
judge]. 38
The following striking anecdote suggests that the perception about negative
impressions from a delay followed by an acceptance or attempted acceptance
is likely to be correct for at least some judges:
I have an interview scheduled with my most preferred judge
([Judge C]) on [later date]. [Judge D] calls and wants me to
interview on [earlier date]. I ask [Judge D] when she would be
making her offers, and she says, “I am going to wait until after
I finish all the interviews, talk with my clerks and then
decide—so [after the later date of the Judge C interview].” So,
I go to interview with [Judge D] on [earlier date]. I explain
that I have another interview scheduled on [later date] during
the interview. She calls me on [date prior to later date of
Judge C interview] with an offer. I like [Judge D], but have
my heart set on at least getting to interview with [Judge C].
Because [Judge D] is not willing to wait until at least [later
date], I decline saying I would like to interview further before
making my decision. [Judge D] gets fairly offended and says,

36
37
38

1999 Student Survey #131.
1999 Student Survey #50.
2000 Student Survey #12.
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“you know, students should withdraw right after the interview
if they are not going to accept an offer.”39
The perception that one is “obliged to accept every offer”40 is part of the
reason that, as explained in the following section, students overwhelmingly
respond not only quickly but affirmatively upon receiving a clerkship offer.
iii. Third step: responses to offers are generally
acceptances—even when other positions would be
preferred.
A significant majority (73%) of students responding to our 2000
survey of second-year students accepted the first offer they received, as shown
in Table 8. (We did not ask a parallel question in the 1999 survey.) Consistent
with this evidence—and presumably in large part because of it—almost 70%
of students who received one or more clerkship offers received exactly one,
also as shown in Table 8. Once again, the law clerk market does not appear to
be one in which students have the opportunity to consider a range of options
before making their decisions.

39
40

1999 Student Survey #135.
Id.
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Table 8: The Practice of Accepting the First Offer Received, 1999-2000
Offer information
First offer was accepted (of the
102 students who responded to
this question)
Yes
No
Number of offers (of the 101
students who responded to this
question and received one or
more offers)a
1
2
3
4
5
6

Percent of responding
students

Cumulative
percentage

73%
27%

73%
100%

68%
25%
3%
2%
1%
1%

68%
93%
96%
98%
99%
100%

Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey.
a
2000 Second-Year Survey #12 did not indicate the number of offers received but
did answer the question about whether the first offer was accepted; thus we have
101 responses here compared to 102 above.

One might respond at this point that students’ first offers may often
come from their top-choice judges, so that the inability to consider other
options is of little consequence for them. Students certainly have some control
over the timing of their interviews, and thus (one might argue) they can
arrange to interview first with their top-choice judges. It is clear that at least
some students attempt to engage in such behavior; as one student wrote in
response to our 1999 survey,
Throughout the process I . . . strategize[d] and manipulate[d] . .
. not answering the telephone for fear of being trapped into a
less-than-ideal interview early on, and trying to arrange
interviews strategically . . . .41
The question is how widespread and, more importantly, how successful these
efforts prove to be.
One difficulty in scheduling interviews strategically, so as to meet topchoice judges first, is that prior to interviewing with a number of judges,
students may well not know who their top choices are. (And, of course, the
same goes for judges.) As one student wrote, “[T]he ability to research the
41

1999 Student Survey #112.
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federal judiciary in advance so that you know exactly for whom you would
and would not accept an offer is impossible. What is the point of the interview
on the students’ side if it can’t be used to further screen for [judge] quality?”42
But even given their limited information, our 2000 student survey
results make clear that students are not able to arrange their interviews
optimally so that an early offer comes from what they regard (based on the
limited information they have) as their top-choice judge. As reported in Table
9, in only about one-third of cases was a student’s first offer from what the
student perceived to be his or her top-choice judge. Yet, as the table shows,
58% of students who received their first offer from a judge who was not their
top choice nonetheless accepted that offer. Indeed, correlating these results
with the earlier results about the timing of acceptance, 26% of these candidates
accepted the offer from the non-top-choice judge immediately! (This last result
is not shown on the table.) The results in Table 9 are even more striking since
one might expect cognitive dissonance to push students toward the ex post
belief that the offers they received or accepted were more desirable than they
otherwise might have been thought to be.

42

1999 Student Survey #135.
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Table 9: Desirability of and Response to a Student’s First Offer,
1999-2000
Desirability of and response to first offer
First offer was first choice position
Of the 102 students who responded
to this question:
Yes
No
First offer was accepted
Of the 35 students for whom first
offer was first choice position:
Yes
No
Of the 67 students for whom first
offer was not first choice position:
Yes
No

Percent of responding students

34%
66%

100%
0%

58%
42%

Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey.

The results reported in Table 9 are consistent with related evidence
from our 1999 student survey. That year we asked students to rank the judges
with whom they got interviews from most to least preferred and then asked
them to list the lowest judge from whom they would have accepted an offer if
they had not yet heard back from more preferred judges. 96% of respondents
would have accepted an offer from a judge in the lower half of their list rather
than wait for their other scheduled interviews. 44% would have accepted an
offer from their least preferred judge. The point is not that a clerkship with the
least preferred judge would be an undesirable outcome in an absolute sense (if
no other options were available), but that many students are apparently willing
to forego any chance at the range of more attractive options to avoid losing the
certain opportunity with the least preferred judge. Although the 1999 question,
unlike the question from the 2000 survey, has a hypothetical element, it
indicates strongly that students will accept offers from less preferred judges
even when they are awaiting scheduled interviews with more preferred judges.
As with the practice of speedy responses to the first offer, the reasons
for the likelihood of acceptance of the first offer are easy to understand. To
begin, many students may fear that declining an offer is an affront to the judge,
as already noted. This fear may result among other things from pressure
exerted by law professors, who are repeat players with institut ional interests
and who may feel that immediate acceptances from their school’s students
enhance the chances for students from that school the following year. Judge
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Becker, then-Judge Breyer and then-Dean Calabresi bemoan “the
‘conventional wisdom’ propagated in many law schools that applicants are
obliged to accept the first offer tendered,” a state of affairs that the authors
“find . . . inexplicable and indefensible.”43 But institutional interests may
explain the puzzle; professors may tell students they must or should accept
immediately even though some judges do not require this because it serves the
broader interests of the institution over the years.
A second critical factor is the strong student aversion to sacrificing a
“bird in the hand” for uncertain prospects down the road. Many student
comments, quoted in Table 10, suggest that students often accept less
preferred positions because they do not know whether they will have other
options later on. Apparently, accepting an early offer from a less preferred
judge is preferred to waiting out the market. But obviously it may mean that
students miss out on the chance to match with preferred judges who may be
extremely interested in them.

43

Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 223.
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Table 10: The “Bird in the Hand” Rationale for Accepting an
Early Clerkship Offer
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#46

I was made an offer in late January before the majority of my
judges even started interviewing. I chose to accept the offer with a
judge who was not in the top ½ rather than take the chance on
waiting for a more preferred judge to call.

1999 Survey
#120

I was offered an early interview by one judge who, though I knew
I would be happy clerking for, was not my top choice. I was led to
believe he might offer a position at the interview. I had a difficult
time deciding whether to go to the interview (and possibly
foreclose other options) or cancel (and possibly lose the bird in the
hand). I went. Got an offer. Accepted.

1999 Survey
#164

[A]t the end I was in Union Station in DC, waiting to get a bus to
Dulles, [Judge A’s] office had me on hold because they said
they’d tell me yes/no by [a particular time], and I was missing
calling back [Judge B], whose offer exploded at [that same time].
I ended up calling [Judge B] to ask for more time, but realized
how rude that would be, so I accepted [Judge B] without knowing
[Judge A’s] decision. And I missed my plane!

1999 Survey
#5

[W]hile in [southern city] I had received an offer from a district
court judge (with 24 hours to reply). I checked my messages at
home and found I had been offered an interview with an appellate
court judge (I had essentially given up on the appellate court
market at this time). But I decided just to take the ‘bird in the
hand.’

2000 Survey
#246

The day after my offer, I was very interested in the offer, but I
also wanted to continue interviewing because I wanted more
information to make [my] decision. However, my judge (the one I
accepted with) indicated that he would continue to interview and
might fill my slot.

2000 Survey
#247

I got an offer from a judge who was not my first choice, at the end
of an interview, and had to respond by the next morning. I had an
interview with my first choice judge scheduled for the next day. I
was risk averse and took the exploding offer, but still wonder if I
did the right thing.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys.
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iv. Fourth step: subsequent interviews are cancelled.
As a result of the speed with which judges and students pair off early
on, both students and judges end up canceling large numbers of previously
scheduled interviews. Two-thirds (66%) of the judges responding to our
2000 survey, and 79% of those responding to our 1999 survey, had at least
one applicant cancel a scheduled interview, as shown in the bottom panel of
Table 11. On ave rage, each judge conducted approximately 8 interviews and
experienced approximately 2 cancellations in each year, 44 so approximately
20% of all scheduled interviews were cancelled by students (2 cancellations
for every 10 scheduled interviews). These numbers fit nicely with the student
surveys: as reported in Table 12, almost half of the students responding to
our 2000 survey reported that they cancelled at least one interview, and a
total of 161 of 695 scheduled interviews, or 23%, were cancelled by
students. 45 Presumably judges also cancelled at least some interviews (or at
least one would hope that they did), since, as reported in Table 19 below, a
substantial number of judges had no clerkship positions left by the time of
their last scheduled interview.
Of course, some cancellations of later interviews may be efficient, as
when neither judge nor student was at the top of the other’s list, and
preferred options materialize for both. But, as demonstrated above, at least
from the student side, early offers often come from non-top-choice judges,
and so applicants are missing out on the chance to consider what might be
more preferred alternatives.
Table 11: Interviews and Student Cancellations As Reported By Judges
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These numbers are based on the figures reported in Table 11. The
calculations assume the mean value for the ranges reported on the actual
survey (for instance, 1.5 interviews for a judge who chose the “1 to 2”
option); for the “more than 12” range for interviews conducted, they assume
a value of 14, and for the “more than 6” range for interviews cancelled, they
assume a value of 8.
45
These numbers are based on the figures reported in Table 12. Twentyeight students who reported the number of interviews they had scheduled did
not report the number of interviews they cancelled. This is probably a
consequence of our wording of the cancellation question, which said “How
many interviews did you schedule and later cancel when you accepted a
position?” It seems plausible that students who did not receive any offers did
not respond to this question. Such students presumably did not cancel any
interviews. The 23% figure in the text thus reflects the assumption that
students who responded to the question about the number of interviews
scheduled but not to the question about the number of cancellations did not
cancel any scheduled interviews.
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Percent of responding judges (cumulative
percentages in parentheses)
1998-1999
1999-2000
Number of interviews
conducted
1 to 3
4 to 6
7 to 9
10 to 12
More than 12

Number of
cancellations by
students
1 to 2
3 to 4
5 to 6
More than 6
None

8% (8%)
25% (33%)
24% (57%)
25% (82%)
18% (100%)

16% (16%)
26% (42%)
20% (62%)
16% (78%)
22% (100%)

Total number of
responses:
134

Total number of
responses:
105

40% (40%)
21% (61%)
13% (74%)
4% (79%)a
21% (100%)

31% (31%)
21% (52%)
7% (59%)
7% (66%)
34% (100%)

Total number of
responses:
137

Total number of
responses:
113

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
a
The cumulative percentage of 79% does not equal the sum of 74% and 4% as a
consequence of rounding.
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Table 12: Interviews and Student-Initiated Cancellations, 1999-2000

Number of interviews scheduled
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
20
Total
Number of interviews cancelled
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
10
11
Total

Number of
responding
students

Percent of
responding
students

Cumulative
percentage

Number
of
interviews

4
15
14
17
10
12
13
14
7
1
4
3
3
4
1
3
2

3%
12%
11%
13%
8%
9%
10%
11%
6%
1%
3%
2%
2%
3%
1%
2%
2%

3%
15%
26%
39%
47%
57%a
67%
78%
84%
85%
88%
90%
92%
95%
96%
98%
100%

0
15
28
51
40
60
78
98
56
9
40
33
36
52
14
45
40

127

42
16
14
13
6
4
1
1
1
1
99

695

42%
16%
14%
13%
6%
4%
1%
1%
1%
1%

42%
59%b
73%
86%
92%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%

0
16
28
39
24
20
6
7
10
11
161

Source: 2000 Student Survey.
a
The cumulative percentage of 57% does not equal the sum of 47% and 9% as a
consequence of rounding.
a
The cumulative percentage of 59% does not equal the sum of 42% and 16% as a
consequence of rounding.
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v. Corollary: students limit their application pools.
A natural consequence of the speed with which things resolve in the
market for federal judicial law clerks is that students have an incentive not to
apply to judges within that market in whom they are interested but not that
interested. Our student survey in both 1999 and 2000 asked, “Did you limit
the number of judges to whom you applied based on a concern that some of
your less-preferred judges would offer you interviews or positions before you
had heard back from your more-preferred judges?” More than half of the
respondents (55%) answered “yes” to this question in 2000 (of a total of 128
responses to this question). In 1999 42% answered “yes” (of a total of 108
responses to this question).
It should be noted that the efficiency aspects of this feature of the
clerkship market are less clear than the efficiency aspects of the features
discussed above. Some desirable matches may not be made—as when a
student does not apply to a given judge who would have hired the student,
and for whom the student would have liked to clerk, and the student ends up
with no clerkship at all—but at the same time, limited application pools save
resources that would have been spent by judges, recommenders, and other
parties on matches that might never have materialized.
vi. Another corollary: students opt out of the process
entirely.
The nature of the law clerk hiring process may also lead some
students not to apply at all. More than half (58%) of the students who said in
response to our 2000 survey that they did not apply for federal appellate
clerkships reported that their decision not to apply was influenced by either
the nature or the timing of the market. (We discuss the timing of the
market—the early date at which the market takes place—in more detail
below.) We did not ask a similar quantitative question of students in 1999,
but from that year we have anecdotal evidence, summarized in Table A7 in
the Data Appendix, of a similar effect of the nature of the process on
students’ decisions to apply. Obviously, if students who choose not to apply
are missing opportunities that they would (in a better world) want to pursue,
and judges would be interested in some of these individuals, then the nature
of the process of law clerk hiring is impeding the satisfaction of judges’ and
students’ preferences.
b. Early hiring.
The law clerk market may fail to maximize judges’ and clerks’
satisfaction not only as a result of the nature of the process (the focus of the
previous discussion) but also as a result of the early time at which hiring
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occurs. As noted in Part I above, when hiring occurs early, judges have less
information on which to base their decis ions about which clerks would be
most attractive to them. Likewise, students have less information about
whether and where they would like to clerk. Our survey results show both that
the clerkship market has moved progressively earlier in time over the last three
hiring seasons and that the early time at which the market moves—like the
nature of the process itself—discourages some students from applying at all.
i. Evidence on timing in the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000
clerkship markets.
Our survey results show that the clerkship market moved relatively
early in the second year of law school in 1998-1999 and earlier still in 19992000; these results thus provide a striking illustration of unraveling in
progress. Table 13 compiles the information reported by judges about the
timing of the market in these two years. For 1998-1999, 28% of judges had
begun interviewing and making offers by the end of January 1999, and 63%
had reviewed applications by that time. These numbers are remarkable in light
of the policy of the leading law schools during 1998-1999 that applications and
recommendation letters from law school faculty were not to be sent prior to
February 1. As the data dramatically show, this policy did not hold up. The
data also reveal that a substant ial number of judges moved earlier in 19981999 than they had in 1997-1998, as reported in the penultimate row of Table
13.
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Table 13: Timing of the Market As Reported by Judges

Sept. or
earlier
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
Feb.

Percent of judges responding
(cumulative percentages in parenthesis)
Date of Review of
Date of Interviews
Applications
and Offers
1998-1999 1999-2000
1998-1999
1999-2000
start
finish
start
finish
a
b
a
date
date
date
dateb
2%
14%
1%
1%
0%
0%
(2%)
(14%)
(1%)
(1%)
(0%)
(0%)
2%
7%
0%
0%
3%
1%
(4%)
(21%)
(1%)
(1%)
(3%)
(1%)
2%
22%
1%
1%
12%
8%
c
(7%)
(43%)
(2%)
(2%)
(15%)
(9%)
21%
29%
7%
1%
29%
22%
(28%)
(72%)
(9%)
(3%)
(44%)
(31%)
35%
11%
19%
16%
27%
32%
(63%)
(83%)
(28%)
(19%)
(71%)
(63%)
23%
4%
43%
38%
10%
17%
(86%)
(87%)
(70%)d
(57%)
(80%)e
(80%)
14%
13%
30%
43%
20%
20%
(100%)
(100%)
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
28%
55%
34%
56%

March
or later
earlier
than the
prior
year
later
2%
4%
3%
3%
than the
prior
year
Total number of judges responding: 134 for 1998-1999, 112 for 1999-2000

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
a
The start date is the date at which the judge started conducting interviews and making
offers.
b
The finish date is the date at which the judge finished conducting interviews and
making offers.
c
The cumulative percentage of 7% does not equal the sum of 4% and 2% as a
consequence of rounding.
d
The cumulative percentage of 70% does not equal the sum of 28% and 43% as a
consequence of rounding.
e
The cumulative percentage of 80% does not equal the sum of 71% and 10% as a
consequence of rounding.
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Things happened even more quickly, and by a substantial margin, in
1999-2000. As shown in Table 13, 72% of responding judges indicated that
they had reviewed applications by the end of December, compared to only 28%
in 1998-1999. 44% indicated that they had started to interview candidates and
make offers by the end of December, compared to only 9% in 1998-1999. By
the end of January, 63% were completely done with interviews and offers,
compared to only 19% in 1998-1999. Also as shown in Table 13, 55% of
responding judges said that they reviewed applications earlier in 1999-2000
than they had in 1998-1999, and 56% said they conducted interviews and made
offers earlier in 1999-2000, while almost no judges said they did either step
later. By any measure, then, the clerkship market moved substantially earlier in
1999-2000 than in 1998-1999. Table A8 in the Data Appendix provides similar
timing information broken down by Circuit.
On the student side, 81% of the students who did one or more
interviews in 1999-2000 reported having at least one interview before the
end of December of 1999, as shown on Table 14. 57% of the students who
received one or more offers during 1999-2000 reported having at least one
offer before the end of December of 1999, as also shown on the table.

Table 14: Timing of the Market Reported by Students, 1999-2000
Date

Sept. or
earlier
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
Feb. or
later
Number
of
responses

Sent
applications

First contact First interview First offer
from a judge (among
(among
(among
students who
students who
students who did
received
received such interviews)
offers)
contacts)
(cumulative percentages in parentheses)
2% (2%)
0% (0%)
0% (0%)
0% (0%)

20% (22%)
67% (89%)
10% (99%)
0% (99%)
1% (100%)

3% (3%)
42% (45%)
42% (87%)
10% (97%)
3% (100%)

2% (2%)
24% (26%)
55% (81%)
15% (96%)
4% (100%)

0% (0%)
14% (14%)
43% (57%)
29% (86%)
14% (100%)

128

124

120

102

Source: 2000 Second-Year Survey.

For skeptics who tend toward the view that the current market for
federal judicial law clerks must be operating efficiently, the data presented
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here raise serious questions. If 1999-2000 was efficient, then was 1998-1999,
when hiring occurred substantially later, also efficient, or was it inefficient?
More generally, given how much the timing in this market has bounced
around over the years, it seems hard to assert that any current resting point is
efficient.
The efficiency argument seems particularly strained for the 19992000 market, when the timing of the market clashed with both students’ final
exams and the law firm recruitment process. Tables A9-1 and A9-2 in the
Data Appendix summarize student complaints about these clashes. It seems
hard to believe that the 1999-2000 timing was optimal in any respect.
ii. Effects of early hiring on decisions to participate in the
market.
As noted above, students may opt out of the law clerk market because
of the nature of the hiring process; they may also opt out because of the early
time at which hiring occurs. As noted above, we know that more than half
(58%) of the students who said in response to our 2000 survey that they did
not apply for federal appellate clerkships reported that their decision not to
apply was influenced by either the nature or the timing of the market. Also as
noted above, for 1999 we have anecdotal evidence from students who did not
apply for federal clerkships, and, as shown in Table A7 in the Data
Appendix, for a number of these students the early time at which hiring
occurs was a significant factor. Thus, the early time at which hiring occurs,
like the nature of the process, may reduce the satisfaction of judges and
students by dissuading some students from applying at all.
2. Disillusionment with the federal bench.
Moving from the efficiency criterion to the concern with
disillusionment with the federal bench, our survey results provide strong
support for the view that the rough-and-tumble nature of the clerk hiring
process carries risks to the regard in which the federal judiciary is held. A
number of respondents to our judge and student surveys emphasized this
concern, as summarized by the often poignant comments quoted in Table 15.
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Table 15: Law Clerk Hiring and Regard for the Federal Judiciary
Survey

Comment

1999 Judge
Survey #7

[T]he current non-system makes applicants see judges behaving in
ways which are unseemly, to put it mildly. That view of our
behavior will inevitably shape what these people think of the
judiciary. To the extent that many of these applicants will become
leaders in the bar and in politics, we will as judges reap what we
have sown. They will hold us in contempt and will not be wholly
wrong.

2000 Judge
Survey #11

The unseemly haste to hire law clerks is a disgrace to the federal
bench.

2000 Judge
Survey #5

The students think our hiring process is foolish. We are presently
embarrassing ourselves with our lack of self-control.

2000 Judge
Survey #101

The current approach reflects poorly on the judiciary.

1999 Student I can’t overstate how disillusioned, disgusted and depressed the
Survey #111 whole clerkship application system has left me. . . . [W]atching
federal judges panic and lie [and] having interviews canceled after
traveling to New York makes me clearly realize that this system
needs reform.
1999 Student Some judges scrapped decorum and even bare civility. One federal
Survey #154a district court judge asked a student to sneak into his office on a
Sunday in January, through the service entrance. His court had
agreed not to conduct early interviews, he explained, and he
wanted to cheat in secret.
2000 Student Federal judges (many of them) suffer from immaturity,
Survey #6
unprofessionalism, and egotism that I guess should be expected
from life-tenured government employees who have no incentive to
behave like adults.
2000 Student The gamesmanship that currently pervades the process is
Survey #43
incredibly frustrating to students and . . . corrosive of the dignity
of the federal judiciary.
1999 Student I accepted an interview offer with a judge on the West Coast and
Survey #104 flew out at considerable expense. At the end of the interview, it
became evident that the judge had already made enough
outstanding offers to fill his slots. I believe that he interviewed me
as a ‘backup.’
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys and Second-Year Student Surveys.
a
This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written
about the market for federal judicial law clerks.
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The comments in Table 15 are obviously anecdotal. However,
quantitative data from our judge surveys make clear that the underlying forms
of judicial behavior noted in the table are far from isolated. The practice of
interviewing candidates (at the candidates’ expense) when no slots remain
available is far less rare than we would have guessed prior to the surveys. We
would have guessed that this occurred only very occasionally; indeed, one
judge wrote in response to our inquiry about whether the judge had at least one
slot left by the time of the last scheduled interview, “Yes, of course. What kind
of a slug do you take me for?”46
The numbers, however, show a striking number of self-confessed
“slugs.” In 2000, almost one in five responding judges (17%) had no slots
available by the time of their last scheduled interview with a candidate, as
shown in Table 16. Senior judges were more likely to have no slots left than
active judges, as the table shows, but still, in both 1999 and 2000, almost one
in ten active judges admitted to having no slots available by the time of their
last scheduled interview. Some judges presumably cancel scheduled
interviews once their slots are filled, but this may or may not spare the
candidate the expense of a fruitless trip depending on the refundability of the
candidate’s airplane ticket.
Table 16: Judges Who Had No Slots Left By the Time of Their
Last Scheduled Interview
Group

All federal appellate judges
Active judges
Senior judges
Senior status not specified

Percent of responding judges with no slots
left by the time of their last scheduled
interview
1998-1999
1999-2000
11%
17%
9%
9%
10%
32%
100%
N/A
Total number of
responses:
139

Total number of
responses:
110

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

The lack of open slots by the end of the interview period is a natural
tendency of a process under which the great majority of judges start making
offers before completing their interviews. In both 1999 and 2000,
approximately three-quarters of active judges responding to our surveys had
46

2000 Judge Survey #90.
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made at least some offers before the completion of interviews, as shown in
Table 3 above. We do not mean to suggest that offering some positions
before the end of interviewing is necessarily objectionable, but it does
obviously mean that those interviewing later—who may be paying large
sums to travel to the interview—are competing for fewer and fewer
positions.
Students responding to our surveys expressed not only direct
concerns about judges’ conduct but also a general disenchantment (voiced in
no uncertain terms) with the clerk hiring process. Tables 17-1 and 17-2
provide a sampling of some of the most striking comments. Of course, these
responses may not represent a random slice of student opinion; presumably
we were more likely to hear from students dissatisfied with the process than
from those who were pleased with it. At the same time, it is critical
emphasize that, as the right-hand column of the tables reveals, the sources of
the negative student comments appear generally to have been quite
successful in the clerkship market. This is particular clear for 1999, when we
asked for detailed information about the judges from whom the student
received offers. Our measure for 2000—the total number of offers the
student received—is less informative, but it still seems noteworthy that none
of the students quoted failed to receive at least one clerkship offer. Thus, this
is not a group of disgruntled students who received no clerkship offers or (at
least insofar as 1999 reveals) only offers from relatively unappealing judges.
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Table 17-1: Student Reactions to the Law Clerk Market, 1999
Survey

Comment

Student’s
Outcome

#184

It's terrible. Just about anything, including
malicious lies, forcible running with scissors,
and active misuse of electric cords, would be
better.

No offer.

#119

Craziness.

Two offers from
highly prestigious
Court of Appeals
judges.

#172

Insane.

Three offers from
highly prestigious
Court of Appeals
judges.

#178

Chaotic.

Three offers from
top District Court
judges in
Washington DC
and New York
City.

#168

Brutal.

Offer from a
highly prestigious
Court of Appeals
judge.

#123

A total mess.

Offers from three
prestigious Court
of Appeals and
District Court
judges.

#121

[A] complete mess.

Offers from four
prestigious Second
Circuit judges.

Source: 1999 Second-Year Student Survey.
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Table 17-2: Student Reactions to the Law Clerk Market, 2000
Survey

Comment

Student’s
Outcome

#26

You will have to arrest me before I will again
set foot in [specified courthouse]. I would not
wish this process on my worst enemy.

1 offer.

#9

One of the most arbitrary and ill-designed
processes I’ve ever come across.

1 offer.

#20

A crap shoot.

1 offer.

#21

Horrible.

2 offers.

#23

One of the worse experiences at law school.

2 offers.

#25

Chaos.

2 offers.

#28

Absolute hell.

1 offer.

#32

Crazy.

2 offers.

#40

Disorganized and chaotic.

2 offers.

#200

A zoo.

2 offers.

#234

A mess.

1 offer.

#240

The clerkship hiring process is a disgrace. It is 1 offer.
everything that we are taught at law school to
dislike: inefficient, arbitrary and capricious and
designed to benefit those with connections and
inside information.

#245

Deeply unfair.

1 offer.

#246

An extremely unpleasant process.

1 offer.

#247

Terrible.

3 offers.

#252

Totally outrageous, . . . stressful [and] chaotic. 2 offers.

#255

Clerkship hiring is like flying through the air
without a net, you never know where you’ll
land, and how hurt you’ll be in the process.

1 offer.

Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey.
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Almost as interesting as some of the quotations in Tables 17-1 and
17-2 was the following remark from a student who had a more positive view
of the clerkship hiring process: “I think it benefits law students at privileged
schools to be subjected to the same random, difficult job search process that
people in other fields have to [undergo].”47 Perhaps that is the best argument
to be made for the current process, but it does not suggest that this process is
one that is likely to cast the federal judiciary in a particularly favorable light.
3. Perceived fairness.
As noted in Part I above, some students may regard the law clerk
market as unfair to the extent that the frenzied manner and early timing of
hiring lead the market to rely on various forms of personal well-connectedness
in matching applicants with judges. Students with relationships to previous
high achievers in the legal world and elsewhere may be advantaged in the
clerkship competition as a result of the limited information available to judges.
Our survey results provide evidence both that personal well-connectedness
does matter in at least some cases and that some students (and judges) regard
this as unfair. Note that our claim is not that such reliance is “unfair” (however
defined) but simply that some participants in this market regard it as such and
experience disutility as a result. Also, it may be that any process would be
regarded as unfair by some, but the fairness objections we describe below
appear to be shared by a larger group than would probably be the case under a
different system.
a. Peer recommendations.
An intriguing feature of the market for federal judicial law clerks is the
role played by other students’ and recent graduates’ recommendations. In
some instances clerks or judges solicit the opinions of applicants’ current
classmates, as reflected in the survey comments reported in Table A10 in the
Data Appendix. These comments show both that peer references from current
classmates matter in this market and that at least some students regard this as
unfair.
At least as important as recommendations from current classmates are
recommendations from recent law school graduates who are currently
clerking. Our 1999 and 2000 judge surveys show that two-thirds of responding
judges (68% in 1999 and 66% in 2000) use current clerks to screen
applications. Table 18 shows that, at least anecdotally, current clerks may rely
in part on their personal connections in performing the screening function.
Interestingly, at least two of the students quoted in the table (the third and
47
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eleventh quotations) seemed to regard the effect of the personal connection
as unfair even though they were presumably helped by it.
Table 18: The Role of Connections with Current Law Clerks
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#109

With [a particular judge] one of his clerks I knew from law school.
The judge made it clear that this clerk was rooting for me.

1999 Survey
#160

I have a good friend clerking for [a particular judge] who thought
we would be a good fit−I’m sure her influence was helpful.

1999 Survey
#163

I know the current clerks of [two particular judges with whom the
candidate received interviews]. Both have assured me that I
received interviews on my merits . . . . That’s what they say, but I
can’t help but feel like perhaps they had some influence.

1999 Survey
#134

A current clerk [of a judge from whom the student received an
offer] is an acquaintance of mine and helped get me an interview.

1999 Survey
#115

Current clerks in [two particular judges’ chambers, who were
graduates of the candidate’s law school, played an important role].
I am pretty sure they had good things to say about me to their
respective judges.

1999 Survey
#49

A [clerk for a particular judge] helped me get an interview.

1999 Survey
#55

[Knowing a current clerk for a particular judge] probably
expedited my ability to get the interview [with that judge].

2000 Survey
#5

[T]wo current clerks with whom I had worked either called me for
an interview with their judge or recommended me to another judge
in the same circuit.

2000 Survey
#12

I knew the current clerk of a judge who interviewed me, I’m sure
that clerk played a role in my getting the interview.

2000 Survey
#20

I was acquainted with one of the clerks currently working for [a
judge from whom this candidate received a clerkship offer].

2000 Survey
#32

I think there would have been no chance of me interviewing with
[a particular judge] if a friend of mine hadn’t been one of her
clerks. That made it all the more satisfying when I [later] got an
interview with [a different judge] whom I know I have no contact
with.
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Table 18: The Role of Connections with Current Law Clerks (continued)
Survey

Comment

2000 Survey
#39

One of the current clerks [of a particular judge] is an old
acquaintance.

2000 Survey
#251

The two appellate and six SDNY [Southern District of New York]
interviews were all with judges with whom I had some connection
through their clerks.

2000 Survey
#254

I know, and was not hurt by, a current clerk.

2000 Survey
#10

One current clerk for [a particular judge] used to be an
acquaintance at school. I think he helped get me an interview.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys.

b. Faculty “clerkship brokers.”
Clearly law professors play an important role in the clerkship process;
their recommendations of students are a significant component in judges’
evaluation of applicants, as shown in Table A11 in the Data Appendix. No one
seems to regard that in itself as unfair. But sometimes the role of the faculty
member goes beyond the familiar role of recommender. In some instances
professors play the role of “interview broker” or “offer broker” in the clerkship
market or even choose the clerks themselves. This is reflected in the comments
from our student and judge surveys reported in Table A12 in the Data
Appendix; it is also reflected more quantitatively in responses to our judge
surveys, which showed that approximately 27% of judges in 1999 and 19% in
2000 relied on professors to screen applications.
At least some students and judges seem to regard the sort of “faculty
feeding” described in our student and judge surveys as unfair:
I am and was completely repulsed by the “this professor
secretly handpicks and recommends a favorite student to a
particular judge” routine. 48
[T]he biggest problem . . . for students [is] the old boy’s
network. If you are not the darling of an aged white male
professor, who may be severely uncomfortable working with
talented women or people of color, you should kiss your
chances of a clerkship goodbye and not bother applying. In
my [particular school] class, approximately 80% of the
students who received circuit court clerkships “applied” as [a]

48

2000 Student Survey #16.
49

formality only, their clerkships were delivered to them by 2 or
3 faculty members. 49
The “special deals” between judges and professors violate the
spirit if not the letter of attempts to hire in a more orderly
way. 50
c. Other forms of well-connectedness.
Social connections may also aid some applicants, and again this may
be regarded as unfair. Table 19 lists student comments suggesting the
importance of various forms of social well-connectedness, including
connectio ns with friends of a judge or a judge’s former clerks. Some
participants in the market are likely to view the role of such connections as
unfair; as one student lamented, “I feel that I was not a party to the network.”51
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Table 19: The Role of Various Type s of Social Connections
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#177

A good family friend called [a particular judge], and I received a
call from the judge about thirty minutes thereafter. [The student
ultimately received an offer from this judge.]

1999 Survey
#120

[A] close friend of [a particular judge] made a call on my behalf.

1999 Survey
#129

A former [clerk for a particular judge] called [that judge] to
recommend me. I think I was [that judge’s] top . . . choice based on
that clerk’s recommendation.

1999 Survey
#130

A former clerk of [a particular judge] is a good friend of mine, and
played a big role.

1999 Survey
#189

With [a particular judge] a family connection helped.

2000 Survey
#7

A former clerk who knew me well called her judge for me.

2000 Survey
#11

Got an interview (and the offer) in [specified court] because old
college friend was ex clerk and talked me up to judge.

2000 Survey
#12

One of my best friend’s father is a law professor and he put in a call
for me to a judge he knows.

2000 Survey
#59

A friend of my mother’s put in a good word with a judge they
knew.

2000 Survey
#234

The clerkship I eventually accepted was offered after a professor at
another law school (who I know well) made a phone call to the
judge.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys.

In short, the law clerk market appears to rely heavily on various
forms of personal well-connectedness, and at least some participants seem to
regard this as unfair.
III. The Experience of Other Markets
The law clerk market is far from alone in its difficulty in establishing
the timing of transactions, with the variety of efficiency and other problems
that result. Table 20 below lists several dozen markets and submarkets that
have experienced the unraveling of transaction dates. Table 20 concentrates
primarily on markets that, like the law clerk market, are entry-level
professional labor markets. Timing problems are particularly easy to identify
in these markets because generally employment cannot begin until the
51

professional has completed his or her education, yet arrangements may be
made far in advance. However, timing problems are not restricted to labor
markets: the list in Table 20 includes the market for postseason college
football bowls. Again timing problems are easy to identify here, since
postseason bowl games cannot be played until the end of the regular season.
Another good example of timing problems in a nonlabor context is fraternity
and sorority rush, where recruitment had at one point moved back into the
preparatory schools from which particular colleges drew their students, despite
the fact that involvement in the fraternity or sorority did not commence until
college. 52 Yet another example is early admission to college; nearly threequarters of high school students who go on to attend elite colleges now apply
for early admission to one or more colleges in response to incentives offered
by colleges. 53
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See Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 1019. Indeed, here the unraveling of
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See Susan Mongell & Alvin E. Roth, Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching
Mechanism, 81 AMER. ECON. REV. 441, 441 (1991).
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See Christopher Avery & Richard Zeckhauser, The Early Admissions
Game: The Perspective of Participants (work in progress).
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Table 20: A Selection of Markets with Timing Problems
Market
Entry-level medical labor
markets:
American first-year
postgraduate (PGY1)
positions
Canadian first-year
positions
U.K. regional markets
for preregistration
positions:
Edinburgh
Cardiff
Birmingham
Newcastle
Sheffield
Cambridge
London Hospital
American specialty
residencies:
Neurosurgery
Ophthalmology
Otolaryngology
Neurology
Urology
Other specialtiesb
Advanced specialty
positions:
12 (primarily surgical) specialtiesc
Medical
Subspecialties
Four ophthalmology
Subspecialties
Plastic surgery

Organization

Stage a

National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP)

3

Canadian Intern and Resident
Matching Service
Regional health authorities

3

3
3
4, 1
4, 1
3 or 4, 1
3
3
Neurological Surgery Matching Program
Ophthalmology Matching Program
Otolaryngology Matching Program
Neurology Matching Program
AUA Residency Matching Program
NRMP

4
3
3
3
3
3 and 4

Specialties Matching Services

3

Medical Specialties Matching Program

3

Ophthalmology Fellowship Match

3

Plastic Surgery Matching Program

3

a

The “stages” are explained in the text just below.
Anesthesiology, emergency medicine, orthopedics, physical medicine, psychiatry,
and diagnostic radiology.
c
Colon/rectal surgery, dermatology, emergency medicine, foot/ankle surgery, hand
surgery, ophthalmic plastic and reconstructive surgery, pediatric emergency medicine,
pediatric orthopedics, pediatric surgery, reproductive endocrinology, sports medicine,
and vascula r surgery.
b
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Table 20: A Selection of Markets with Timing Problems (continued)
Market

Organization

Entry-level legal labor
markets:
Federal court clerkships Judicial Conferences
American law firms
National Association for Law Placement
Canadian articling
Articling Student Matching Program
positions
Toronto
Vancouver
Alberta (Calgary)
Entry-level business
school markets
New MBA's
New marketing
professors
Other entry-level labor
markets:
Japanese university
graduates
Clinical psychology
internships
Dental residencies
(three specialties and
other general
programs)
Optometry residencies
Postseason college
football bowls

Stage

2, then 1
1
3 and 4
3 or 4, then 1
3

1d
1

Ministry of Labor; Nikkeiren

2

Association of Psychology Internship
Centers
Postdoctoral Dental Matching Program

2, then 3

Optometric Residency Matching Services

1 and 3

National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA)

1, then 3

3

Other two-sided matching:
Fraternity rush
Sorority rush
National Panhellenic Conference

1
3
Source: Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and
Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AMER . ECON. REV. 992
(1994).
d
Occasionally.
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In many of the markets in Table 20, considerable effort has been
expended to halt, reverse, or otherwise control the timing of transactions. The
table lists for many of the markets the organization that has been entrusted
with this task. Many of these organizations were created expressly for the
purpose of controlling the unraveling of transaction times. In many instances
these organizations can bring to bear considerable compulsory power. But
frequently a solution to the timing problem has nonetheless proved elusive.
The difficulties encountered by these other markets may therefore illuminate
the problems in the market for federal judicial law clerks and the prospects and
potential pitfalls in the road to reform of this market.
A. A Framework: Four stages of unraveling markets.
To make it easy to describe the common phenomena found in a diverse
set of markets, Table 20 loosely categorizes each market it describes as most
recently being in one of four “stages,” as follows. 54
Markets that are in the process of unraveling—in which appointment
dates are getting earlier from year to year, or in which they have moved to
the earliest feasible date—are stage 1 markets. Here is a generic description
of stage 1:
Stage 1 begins when . . . the relatively few transactio ns [in the
market] are made without overt timing problems. By the
middle of stage 1 . . . some appointments are being made rather
early, with some participants finding that they don't have as
wide a range of choices as they would like–students have to
decide whether to accept early job offers or take a chance and
wait for better jobs, and some employers find that not all of the
students they are interested in are available by the time they get
around to making offers. The trade journals start to be full of
exhortations urging employers to wait until the traditional time
to make offers, or at least not to make them any earlier next
year than this year. Towards the end of stage 1, the rate of
unraveling accelerates, until sometimes quite suddenly offers
are being made so early that there are serious difficulties
distinguishing among the candidates. There is no uniform time
for offers to be made nor is there a customary duration for them
to be left open, so participants find themselves facing
unnaturally thin ma rkets, and on both sides of the market a
variety of strategic behaviors emerge, many of which are
regarded as unethical practices. Various organizations
concerned with the market may have proposed guidelines
54
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intended to regulate it, without notable success. As stage 1
ends, influential market participants are engaged in a vigorous
debate about what can and should be done. 55
Although this was not written as a description of the law clerk market, it fits it
to a “T”.
Stage 2 markets are those that have instit uted regulations specifying the
time before which offers and sometimes other contacts cannot be made, and
sometimes how long offers must remain open. Stage 2 markets are still
decentralized, with employers contacting potential employees directly to make
offers. During each of the six attempted reforms of the law clerk market, this
market was in stage 2. For instance, the most recent attempted reform specified
February 1 as the date before which contacts could not be made and March 1
as the date before which (in effect) offers could not be made. 56
Stage 3 markets are those that have instituted centralized market
clearing procedures, which not only serve to determine the time at which
transactions take place, but also organize the transactions (the order in which
offers are made and the point at which transactions are finalized). The most
common form of stage 3 organization has potential employers and employees
contacting each other (via applications, interviews, etc.) in a decentralized
way, after which each employer submits a rank ordering of applicants to a
central clearinghouse, to which each applicant also submits a rank ordering of
positions. The clearinghouse then uses these preference lists, in some prespecified way (now often formalized in a computer program), to produce a
match, and employers and employees are simultaneously informed of the
results of the match. Perhaps the largest and best known of the centralized
markets is the one by which new medical school graduates are matched to
first-year residencies. But, as Table 20 makes clear, lawyers too participate in
stage 3 markets; “articling” positions required before being called to the bar in
Canada are arranged in this way in several major cities.
Stage 4 markets are those with centralized mechanisms, but in which
there has been at least some unraveling prior to the centralized market, as
participants jockey for advantage in the centralized procedure.
[T]he unraveling has often taken the form of recruiting students
for summer internships (or in the case of some medical
specialties for ‘audition electives’), which amount to extensive
interviewing opportunities in which the students spends a
55
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period of weeks or even months at the firm. Because of the
length of time involved, students can interview in this way at
only a very small number of firms, and firms can interview
only a few students in this way. Because the percentage of new
employees hired by each firm who were previously summer
interns there sometimes becomes quite high, these internships
can become a way of moving the recruiting process before the
centralized matching mechanism. 57
These four stages provide a framework within which to discuss the
particular markets from Table 20 in more detail. In the next section we offer
some vignettes from those other markets.
B. Vignettes.
1. Medical residencies.
A good place to begin is with the history of the market for new
American medical school graduates, both because that is the first of these
“unraveling” markets to have been studied as such by economists 58 and
because of its role (discussed more fully in Part IV.C below) in various
proposals to reform the clerkship market. 59 But it is not the successful
experience of the centralized, stage 3 medical market that we wish to discuss
here but instead the period from 1945 to 1951, when the medical market was
organized as a stage 2 market. 60
Prior to 1945 there had been a severe unraveling of appointment dates,
so that medical students were being selected for post-graduation employment
when they still had two full years remaining of medical school (much like
today’s market for federal judicial law clerks). In 1945 the medical schools,
working in conjunction with the residency programs, successfully
implemented an embargo on letters of reference until a specified date, and this
57
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proved effective. The date of appointment was successfully moved to one year
before employment would begin, and in subsequent years the dates at which
letters were released, and appointments made, were moved into the last year of
medical school, nearer to the time of appointment.
But the problems experienced by this market did not end when the
appointment date was controlled (a stage-2-type solution). There followed a
period in which the market was extremely disorderly, with students being
called upon to make increasingly prompt decisions whether to accept offers. In
1945 offers were supposed to remain open for 10 days. Each subsequent year
that interval was shortened, until by 1949 a grace period of 12 hours had been
rejected as too long, and exploding offers were explicitly allowed. What had
happened was that hospitals found that if an offer was rejected very near the
deadline, it was often too late for them to reach their next most preferred
candidates before they had accepted other offers. Even when there was a long
deadline, much of this action was compressed into the last moments, since a
student who had been offered a position at, say, his or her third choice hospital
would be inclined to wait as long as possible before accepting, in the hope of
eventually being offered a preferable position. So, regardless of how long
offers were to remain open, the period just before the deadline was frenzied,
with students seeking to improve on the positions they had been offered by
contacting the hospitals they preferred, and with hospitals sometimes
pressuring students into early decisions in order not to have to contact students
on their waiting lists after the deadline had expired. This of course gave the
hospitals that applied such pressure an advantage over those that did not, with
a longer deadline possibly compounding the advantage.
A central clearinghouse was proposed and adopted only when these
attempts to organize a stage 2 market had been exhausted. With modifications,
this kind of central clearinghouse has been used now in the medical residency
market for almost half a century. The design of the current medical
clearinghouse was directed by one of the authors of this work, 61 and its details
are discussed more fully in Part IV.C below.
2. Post-season college bowls.
The American medical market is large and impersonal, and one
important feature of this market, both before and after the move to a
centralized clearinghouse, is that informal understandings between participants
are not always honored. But in smaller markets, in which participants can
expect to encounter each other again at later points in time, promises can often
be relied on. Paradoxically (since one would ordinarily think that a small
market would make an agreement on a fixed starting date for transactions
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easier to sustain), the small size can further increase the difficulty of achieving
a stage 2 solution.
The experience of post-season college football bowls is illustrative. 62
For many years the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
attempted to control the date at which bowl agreements were signed by
specifying a date (commonly called “Pick-Em Day”) before which such
agreements were forbidden. The idea was to delay selection until sufficiently
late in the regular season that there would be a good chance that teams with the
best records at the end of the season would be matched against one another.
However, despite the considerable penalties the NCAA can levy on teams and
bowls, the fact that informal agreements could be relied upon allowed teams
and bowls to make early agreements and avoid penalties.
During the 1991-1991 football season there were highly publicized
informal agreements, four weeks before the end of the regular season (and two
weeks before Pick-Em Day), which sent Notre Dame to the Orange Bowl,
Miami to the Cotton Bowl, and Virginia to the Sugar Bowl. At that time (with
four games left to play) Notre Dame, Miami, and Virginia were ranked by the
sportswriters' poll as the number 1, 3, and 8 teams in the nation. But, following
some losses before the bowl games were actually played, Notre Dame had
dropped from number 1 to number 5, and Miami had dropped out of the top 20
altogether. “Because of the substantial penalties for breaking NCAA rules,
there are no public accounts of the details of these informal agreements.
However, in confidential discussions with participants in this market, great
confidence was expressed in the reliability of such agreements once made.”63
The NCAA gave up trying to enforce a date for bowl agreements
following the embarrassing experience in the 1990-1991 season. Since then
bowl selection has become more centrally organized (a stage 3 model), based
on agreements between consortia of football conferences and independent
teams and consortia of bowls. Thus, as in the case of the medical market, the
attempt at a stage 2 solution proved infeasible, and a more centralized
mechanism was adopted.
3. Clinical psychology positions.
One of the longest-running stage 2 markets was the American market
for pre- and post-doctoral internships for clinical psychologists, which
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operated as a stage 2 market from the 1970s through the 1997-1998 academic
year. 64 In this market, transactions were all to be made by telephone on
“Selection Day” (akin to Pick-Em Day), a specified day in a specified month
of each year. The rules required that no offers be made before the “opening
time” of the market (9:00 AM Central Standard Time in the early 1990s), and
that all offers made during the course of the market and not yet rejected remain
open until the “closing time” (4:00 PM Central Standard Time in the early
1990s). That is, both early offers and exploding offers (which require a
decision before the end of the market) were not allowed. Programs that still
had some positions vacant after the market closed could then make exploding
offers to fill them.
This market survived for roughly 25 years despite a certain level of
noncompliance, with somewhere between 10% and 25% of students reporting
forbidden contacts from employers before the start of Selection Day. 65 A
variety of rules were formulated to discourage employers from soliciting
promises from applicants that if offered a job they would accept it, but these
too were difficult to enforce. Both the early contacts and the solicitation of
promises seemed to be related to the fact that employers had good reason to try
to avoid making offers that might be rejected late in the day on Selection Day.
The reason is that, at 4:00 PM, students who had offers in hand would accept
them before they expired, so that a firm that had an offer rejected just before
then might find that many of its more preferred alternate candidates had
already accepted positions before they could be contacted. Observations of this
market and interviews with participants suggest that, in deciding to whom to
make offers, employers were substantially influenced by which students had
indicated in advance that they would accept, and that, knowing this, students
very often made such an indication to some employer. Early contacts and
promises had much less force in the market for medical residencies prior to the
move to a stage 3 solution, despite the similar congestion problems that
existed, because (among other things) the size of the market means that a
student who breaks an informal promise in the medical market may well never
to have to deal again with the residency director who elicited it. In the clinical
psychology market, by contrast, promises are reliable, since, as one program
director said to one of us (Roth), “You see these people again.”66
As a result of these problems, the clinical psychology market converted
recently to a centralized clearinghouse, modeled on the medical market but
adapted to the special features of the clinical psychology market. This
centralized market ran for the first time in academic year 1998-1999 for
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positions beginning in June 1999. So, once again, the market moved from
stage 2 (which proved unsuccessful) to stage 3.
4. Japanese university graduates.
Yet another example of a stage 2 market is the market for graduates
of elite Japanese universities. 67 The unraveling in this market is so persistent
and widespread that it has a popular name, aota-gai, which translates as
“harvesting rice while it is still green.” Although hiring before specified
dates is formally prohibited, hiring well in advance of graduation
nevertheless persists through informal but effective guarantees of
employment known as naitei. These informal arrangements are similar to the
understandings that brought down the stage 2 approaches in the college
football and clinical psychology markets.
After a company has offered naitei to a particular candidate, the
informal agreement is enforced through an interesting mechanism.
Companies that offer naitei to students long before the beginning of
employment try to prevent them, via physical restraint, from interviewing
with other companies or government ministries. For example, a company
might invite all of the students to whom it had offered naitei to come on a
company outing on the day the Finance Ministry was offering its civil service
exam, with the understanding that the guarantee of employment would be
withdrawn from any student who missed the outing.
Naitei, then, is a very effective means of making arrangements prior to
the official date allowed in this stage 2 market. Despite the effectiveness of
naitei, this market has continued to be organized (officially) as a stage 2
market, although in its practical effects it is probably more akin to a stage 1
market as a result of the role of naitei.
5. Canadian articling positions.
Canadian law graduates take an “articling” position following
graduation and before being called to the bar. The various regional markets
for articling slots have been subject to unraveling, just as has the American
market for federal judicial law clerks. 68 In response to this problem, two of
the articling markets, in Toronto, Ontario and in Alberta (primarily in
Calgary), are now organized as stage 3 markets employing an algorithm
developed in part by one of the present authors (Roth) initially for the
medical match. 69 As described above, stage 3 markets are ones in which
67
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matching of applicants to positions occurs through a centralized
clearinghouse. Participation in the articling clearinghouses is by a subset of
the firms in each regional market; some firms in each market do not
participate.
A centralized matching system solves one of the fundamental
problems with a stage 2 solution, which is that congestion may occur on the
start date. (Recall that this was the reason for the move to a stage 3 solution
in the market for medical residency positions.) But the problem of implied or
informal agreements in circumvention of the centralized clearinghouse
remains. “Offers” and “acceptances” may be communicated outside the
match with one side telling the other, “I’ll rank you first in the match if you
rank me first.” This effectively moves the match date earlier, even if there is
100% pro forma participation in the centralized process. Applicants and firms
will simply submit forms requesting to be matched with the parties with whom
they had already agreed months in advance. This is by no means an academic
problem; in some failed matches, up to 80% of the matching forms submitted
to the centralized mechanism list only one partner, making clear that
everything has been settled in advance.70
The stage 3 market for articling positions in Canada has taken a
number of interesting steps to address the problem of informal agreements. In
the Toronto match there are detailed regulations governing the nature of
permissible communications between candidates and firms. (The Law Society
of Upper Canada regulates the Toronto articling market. It is more difficult to
get information about the operation of the Alberta market because it works
without the direct oversight of a regulatory body.) The Law Society
regulations seek to control the communication between firms and students
both before and after interviews occur. Recognizing that, in light of the
incomplete coverage of the centralized match and the fact that offers from
nonparticipating firms may need to be acted upon before the match date, it is
impossible to eliminate completely the discussion of rank orderings among
participants—but wishing to prevent students being pressured into “deals”
that would subvert the intention of the match—the regulations attempt to
define and limit what kinds of communication are allowed when firms and
students discuss the upcoming match. The regulations provide that firms may
provide ranking information to students in advance of the match, but only
within a specified time period.
A.8. Subject to the exception noted below regarding summer
students, no communication of ranking intentions shall take
place prior to 8:00 a.m. on Monday, August 14, 2000.
Exception: Firms in the matching program may communicate
ranking intentions to summer students employed with their
70
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firm in the summer months of 2000 prior to Monday, August
14, 2000.71
The regulations further specify that students may, but cannot be
required or pressured to, provide ranking information to firms:
A.9. Firms shall not request from a student, explicitly or
implicitly, information on intentions as to where the student
will rank the firm.
Commentary: Voluntary communication of ranking intentions
by firms made in accordance with procedure A.8 will be
permitted, provided the manner of communication does not
impose pressure on students to reciprocate with
communication of their own ranking intentions. For example,
it is improper for a firm to say to a student “we will rank you
within the firm’s complement of students in the match (or
first, etc.) if you rank us, or tell us, or commit to us, that you
will rank us first . . . .”
A.11. Firms communicating ranking intentions to students .
. . are strongly encouraged to communicate their ranking
intentions using the terminology set out in the Society's
“Guidelines for Firms Participating in the Matching Program
re: Communication of Ranking Intentions to Articling
Candidates.”72
A major source of the pressure to communicate outside the match in
the Canadian articling market has to do with students who have applied both
to firms in the match and firms not in the match. Since many more students
participate in the match than there are positions offered in the match, the
intention of permitting firms to communicate ranking information is to help
students to decide whether or not to accept an offer they may have received
from a nonparticipating firm.
The centralized clearinghouses in the Canadian articling market seem
to be working, although the regulations also show that this market requires
some careful maintenance. The central remaining problem with the Canadian
articling match is the heavy reliance on summer positions to “audition”
articling candidates. In this respect the market has sharp tendencies toward a
stage 4 outcome. There is significant interaction between the market for
articling positions and the market for summer associateships for students
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who have completed their second year of law school. This is not a recent
development but rather one with which the articling market has dealt for a
long time. As a partner at the Toronto law firm of Blake, Cassels & Graydon
observed roughly a decade ago:
Students now feel virtually compelled to obtain a summer job
in Toronto after their second year in law school and as a
result, a substantial portion of the articling hiring process has
now been placed on the shoulders of the summer program.
Students are being hired for summer positions halfway
through their second year in law school….Everyone
recognizes that this is a back-door method of obtaining an
articling position. 73
The market for medical residencies is marked by the same stage 4 tendencies
in a number of subspecialties, as described just below.
6. Medical residencies (again).
As described above, the medical market adopted a centralized
clearinghouse after the failure to organize a successful stage 2 market in the
middle of this century. But as in the Canadian articling market, in certain
subspecialties the selection process may in fact begin well before the
centralized match. In highly competitive areas such as orthopedic surgery and
neurosurgery, preference for residency positions is often given to candidates
who have done “audition electives” with the program in question. 74 These
“auditions” last six weeks and give the program and student a chance to
become acquainted with one another well in advance of the centralized match.
Since students can audition with only a few programs, and programs can offer
auditions to only a few students, the auditions represent a form of
“prematching,” where some selection occurs on both sides well before the
centralized match.
Note that sometimes (in other markets, including the American market
for new law school graduates) summer or “elective” positions do not reflect
efforts to circumvent stage 3 mechanisms. These positions may exist even in
markets without a stage 3 (or stage 2) regime because they provide employers
with useful information about candidates, or candidates with useful
information about employers, prior to entry into a more permanent
commitment. An obvious example here is summer associate positions at
American law firms; these positions do not represent an attempt to “prematch”
in advance of a centralized procedure or specified offer date (since neither
exists in this market, although once an offer—which may be made at any
73

Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 1024 (quoting correspondence from Barry
McGee to Alvin E. Roth, March 25, 1991).
74
Our discussion here draws on id. at 1022-24.
64

time—is made, the National Association for Law Placement regulates the
amount of time for which it must be kept open75 ). Rather the summer
associateship seems to be a way for law firms to gather information about
candidates and provide information to them about the firm. Interestingly,
though, the dates of appointment for summer associateships at American law
firms themselves have unraveled over the years;76 thus, instead of the summer
associateship being a way around a mechanism adopted to control unraveling,
the market for summer associateships is itself subject to unraveling.
IV. Three Decreasingly Modest Proposals for Governing the Market for
Federal Judicial Law Clerks−and How Their Chances of Success Can Be
Made Less Bleak
What can be done about the law clerk market? The possibilities for
reform (or not) are familiar from past experience and the existing literature: 1)
Let the market go without attempting to regulate it (so that it will remain at
stage 1); 2) Establish a start date for offers and perhaps also interviews (the
stage 2 solution, tried several times in the past); and 3) Institute a centralized
clearinghouse (the stage 3 approach). As noted above, because there is a range
of existing opinion on reform, we consider each of the three possibilities just
described rather than focusing on a single one. We attempt to describe how
each could best be implemented and what its odds of success are in light of
what we know from our empirical evidence and the experience of other
markets. Ultimately we conclude that a centralized matching system for
federal appellate clerkships that may lead into Supreme Court clerkships holds
the most hope for reforming the presently unraveling market.
A. The “do nothing” approach: A decentralized market in which
participants are free to act as they wish.
Despite what seems to be a reasonably broad consensus among judges,
clerks, and observers that the market for federal judicial law clerks is not
working particularly well, a number of judges responding to our surveys
expressed strong support, often in colorful terms, for the “do nothing”
approach. Their comments are summarized in Table 21. These statements
were not made in response to a specific question about the desirability of
regulation; they were offered in response to an open-ended question asking
judges whether there was anything else they would like to share with us
about their views of the law clerk market.
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Table 21: Judges’ Criticism of Efforts to Reform the
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#54

I think that it is a waste of time to try to devise ‘systems’ for this
‘process’. I get excellent clerks in the free market and I see no need
for regulation (but then I never do).

1999 Survey
#51

Cartels do not work. People cheat. Judges cheat. Law schools cheat.
Attempts at regulation are an attempt by established eastern law
schools, especially Harvard whose professors are conducting this
survey, to improve their lock on the market.

1999 Survey
#60

Is this an attempt to resurrect the ‘East Coast Law School Cabal?’

1999 Survey
#12

Forget it! Leave it up to the judges and the applicant when to
interview, apply or hire.

1999 Survey
#14

The free market should govern the process. Government
intervention is not justified. If judges want to make offers on the
basis of insufficient data they should be free to do so. If students
want to accept clerkship offers after one day of law school thereby
passing up better opportunities later the market should allow them
to do so.
I would leave it alone and just let judges and law clerks do what
they want to. Laissez faire.

1999 Survey
#37
1999 Survey
#72

I will refuse to be bound by any combination agreement or
conspiracy in restraint of trade. All cures are worse than the
“disease”. . . . Leave it alone and get out of our hair. . . . Free trade
is the best. I do not believe the system is either chaotic or bad. Get
off it.

1999 Survey
#84f

I have no problems and would be happy if nobody tries to impose
rigid rules on me or anyone else.

2000 Survey
#38

[T]he less regulation[] the better. I have never had any problem
handling the process of hiring law clerks. . . . [T]he system is fine as
it is.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

66

What is likely to happen if, in accord with these sentiments, the
market is left unregulated?
Prognosis. Grim. Hiring will continue to occur in a frenzied manner
and is likely to move back even further in the student’s law school career, so
that even less information is available. As already noted, in 1999-2000
interviewing commenced in the early fall of the second year of law school, and
there is no reason in principle why it could not move back until late in the
summer after the first year (when, indeed, travel for interviews might be
particularly easy); no new information emerges between the late part of the
summer (after spring grades, law review selection, and references from
professors for whom students may have worked as summer research assistants
become available) and the early to middle fall. It is even possible that hiring
would move back to the beginning of the second semester of first year, by
which time first-semester grades would be available (except at Yale, where all
first-semester classes are pass-fail; Yale students would thus be at a significant
disadvantage). The good news is that clerkship hiring probably cannot move
any earlier than the first semester of law school.
Palliatives. While we are waiting to see how early is early, judges
could be encouraged to enter their hiring schedules in a generally available
database. Indeed, an approach along these lines was instituted last year by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 77
An information database would, if there were a reasonable degree of
participation, and if participating judges provided accurate dates in a timely
manner, ameliorate some of the existing confusion about judges’ timing, and
this would certainly be a valuable service. However, neither of the two
conditions just noted is likely to hold. The judges who move early to gain a
strategic advantage over other judges are unlikely to participate in a database
for precisely the reasons that drive them to jump the gun in the first place. If it
is widely known that they are moving at a given time, other judges are likely to
move up their schedules in response, and this will reduce the competitive gain
from going early. Consistent with this suggestion, relatively few Court of
Appeals judges list hiring times in the new Administrative Office database.
A further reason for limited participation is that once some judges are
not participating, other judges will be reluctant to commit to particular dates
for hiring clerks because developments in the market may cause them to want
to move earlier; alternatively they may specify particular dates in the database
but then feel compelled to move earlier as a result of changes in the market.
Indeed, even without a centralized database this sort of problem comes up.
Before the creation of the Administrative Office database, chambers frequently
told law school placement offices that they would begin the hiring process on a
certain date but then departed from this date as changes occurred elsewhere in
77
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the market. For all of these reasons, a centralized database is unlikely to
address the fundamental problems in the market for federal judicial law clerks.
B. If at first you don’t succeed, try again: Set start dates.
If remaining in stage 1 seems unappealing, what about a stage 2
solution? The key feature of a stage 2 approach would be that some authority
would set a start date for offers, and perhaps also a start date for interviews, a
length of time for which offers must be left open, or both in an effort to govern
the market for federal judicial law clerks. Obviously various incarnations of
this approach have been tried, and have failed, on several past occasions in this
market. 78 Also, as the vignettes above show, such approaches have been tried,
and have failed, in the markets for medical residencies, college football bowls,
clinical psychology positions, and Japanese university graduates. Indeed, many
of the markets listed in Table 20 have at some points in their history attempted
to organize themselves as stage 2 markets but have failed and either have
slipped back into stage 1 or have adopted a more centralized (stage 3)
organization.
The point is in fact very general: We are aware of no market that has
successfully organized itself as a stage 2 market for an extended period
without problems of the sort observed in the markets discussed above. The
clinical psychology market is the closest case, but even there, as noted above,
there were serious problems of congestion and informal agreements prior to
the specified Selection Day, and this market moved to a stage 3 organization in
1998-1999.
Do the same factors that explain the failures of stage 2 approaches in
the other markets explain the past failures in the law clerk market? Might a
new and improved stage 2 approach work in the latter setting?
Prognosis. Grim. There are several problems, illuminated by the
experiences of the markets described in Part III.
(I) Congestion. The first difficulty is that even if the start date were
fully adhered to by all parties (an unlikely outcome, as we discuss below),
there would be severe congestion in the market on the start date, and this
would preclude participants from considering a range of possible transactions
before making their decisions. Our earlier discussion of the medical residency
market in the late 1940s is illustrative; the reason that the stage 2 solution
failed was not that the start date was not adhered to, but that there was severe
congestion in the market on the start date.
Within the category of start-date regimes, there are two main
approaches. Under the first, there is an offer start date and then either an earlier
78
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start date or no start date for interviews. This was the situation in the clinical
psychology market prior to the institution of the centralized match. As
described above, substantial congestion occurred on Selection Day in this
market. Past reform efforts in the law clerk market likewise demonstrate the
problem. Judge Wald’s account of the 1989-1990 clerk market, when the
Judicial Councils in many circuits had adopted a deadline of May 1 at noon
(Eastern Standard Time) for offers, with a consensus on a one-hour minimum
response time and no limits on interviews prior to May 1, is representative in
its essential features:
[T]he major complaint was the frenzy with which offers had to
be made and accepted. Those judges who gave their choices
time to reflect found themselves severely disadvantaged. The
one-hour window collapsed as applicants fe lt constrained to
accept the first offer tendered. A judge who did not get through
to an applicant at 12:00 noon was often too late. ‘I got my first
choice,’ one judge complained, ‘and, after that, having given
the applicant a half hour, I found my next 8 or 9 choices gone.’
By 12:15 virtually all of the bidding in the D.C. Circuit was
over. Between 12:00 and 12:15, judges were making offers on
one line as calls came in on a second from frantic applicants
trying to learn if they were to get an offer before they
responded to the offer of another judge.79
Congestion problems of this sort are likely to be severe in markets with offer
start dates and earlier, or no, start dates for interviews.
The second possible approach is to have the offer start date also be the
interview start date. This was effectively the situation under the most recent
attempted reform of the law clerk market, under which interviews were not
supposed to occur (under a “nonbinding” Judicial Conference guideline) prior
to March 1. 80 Under this guideline there was no official regulation of offer
times, but one presumes that most judges would not hire applicants for “the
most intense and mutually dependent [relationship] I know outside of
marriage, parenthood, or a love affair”81 without an interview, although a few
judges do take this route,82 and indeed judges, like other employers, may well
systematically overestimate the importance of interview performance relative
to other qualities. 83
79

Wald, supra note 2, at 159.
See Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 207-08.
81
Wald, supra note 2, at 153.
82
See, e.g., 1999 Judge Survey #52.
83
See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 136-37 (1991) (describing tendency to
overrely on interview impressions relative to personal background).
80

69

The difficulty with a common start date for interviews and offers is that
neither judges nor students will be able to conduct or participate in many
interviews. The experience with the March 1 regime was that “both interviews
and offers bunched around the March 1 date, so students had little latitude in
scheduling interviews”84 and little opportunity to interview with a range of
judges (and conversely for the judges).
(II) Cheating. Alongside congestion, the second and equally
fundamental problem with a stage 2 solution is that it is virtually impossible to
prevent defections from the specified start date. This has happened before in
the law clerk market, and it is the overwhelming consensus of judges that it
would happen again. Both our 1999 survey and our 2000 survey posed the
following question to judges: “If the Judicial Conference established, by rule,
a firm start-date for interviews of September 1 of the third year of law
school, do you believe that all or virtually all court of appeals judges would
adhere to this date (in spirit as well as in letter)?” 72% of responding judges
in 1999, and 74% in 2000, stated that they did not believe all or virtually all
of their colleagues would adhere. Our survey showed that most judges say
they are willing to comply if others are (93% in 1999, and 92% in 2000, said
they would comply if “all or virtually all” other Court of Appeals judges
were complying), but the problem is that they do not believe that most others
will comply.
The problem is the familiar one of trying to sustain a self-enforcing
cartel—one in which there is no outside sanction for defection. In general a
cartel is much easier to sustain if strong outside sanctions exist to punish
defectors. In the case of ordinary cartels, antitrust law denies enforcement of
any explicit agreements, thereby eliminating most of the effective outside
means of sanctioning those who defect. Likewise in the context of a start date
for the law clerk market, the ability of some central authority to mete out
punishments to judges who defect is limited by the institutional cons traints
surrounding the judiciary. Particularly because cheating may be far from
explicit (as discussed below), it is difficult to imagine draconian punishments
being handed out to Article III judges. The lack of explicitness, as well as
other factors, likewise make it difficult to imagine handing out strong
punishments to clerkship applicants who were interviewed or hired before the
specified date.
So only a self-enforcing arrangement among judges is realistically
possible. But of course the difficulty of sustaining such an arrangement is well
known. The problem is particularly acute in the clerkship context, since parties
cannot compensate those who are disadvantaged by the arrangement for their
losses. In an ordinary cartel, conflicts of interest among members, if they exist,
can be smoothed over by compensation; for instance, a seller who would
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prefer a higher price than the other members of the cartel can be given a larger
sales quota. But there is no obvious way for a judge who is disserved by a
given start date to be compensated for the losses he or she would incur from
compliance with that date.
It is clear that some judges lose from specified start dates. Obviously,
those judges who wish to gain a strategic advantage over other judges by
jumping the gun are disadvantaged. This is related to our observation in Part
I.B that the unregulated market is unlikely to be Pareto inefficient: at least a
few judges are likely to be made worse off if the bargaining gain they enjoy
from jumping the gun in an unregulated market is eliminated.
But other judges would want to defect as well; this is a consequence of
the congestion caused by a start-date arrangement (hence the defection
problem is linked to the congestion problem discussed above). Our
description of the clinical psychology market in Part III.B.3 precisely
illustrates the problem. The congestion on the start date produces pressure on
parties to try to arrange deals in advance in order to avoid the problems that
come up on the official start date. The problem may be particularly acute
when, as in the 1989-1990 law clerk market, there ends up being no
minimum time that offers must be kept open. (As Judge Wald describes in
the passage quoted above, the one hour minimum period collapsed, at least in
some Circuits, as events got underway on the specified start date.) Here the
market is likely to be over very quickly (as revealed by the description from
Judge Wald quoted just above, where much of the bidding in the D.C. Circuit
was over in 15 minutes), and thus a judge has reason to think that any
candidate not reached very quickly will probably be committed to someone
else. Then the judge has reason to be reluctant to make an offer to a
candidate who is likely to want to hold it for a long time (and as the earlier
quotation makes clear, a long time can be measured in minutes). Thus, in
deciding to whom to make an offer, the judge has some reason to favor
candidates who have indicated a willingness to accept offers quickly. So, in
turn, candidates have an incentive to let judges know that they will accept
their offers, since this makes it more likely that an offer will be received.
Indeed, in the 1989-1990 law clerk market, “[s]avvy clerk applicants . . .
played their own hands. They (or sometimes their sponsoring professors)
called chambers in advance to announce that that particular judge was the first
choice.”85
Yet another reason that defection is hard to control with a stage 2
approach in the law clerk market is that defection will often be difficult to
detect (and hence will be relatively easy to get away with). Often it is not
public knowledge when a clerk is hired. Recall our earlier anecdote (in Table
15) about a judge asking an interviewee to sneak in the service entrance on a
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Saturday. Without some way of verifying when hires were made or contacts
occurred, it is difficult to police defections from a start-date arrangement
(even if enforcement were feasible once defection had been detected).
The problem with start dates is not only that they will be undercut by
defectors—although this is a problem. The problem is that these defectors
make the judiciary look bad, a concern that many judges have voiced and that
was discussed above. A system, such as this one, that depends on honorable
behavior also tends to penalize the honorable and put honor in bad repute. As
one judge said on our survey with regard to “cartel” solutions: “All you do is
create an incentive to cheat—on the part of students and judges alike.”86
This sort of concern was precisely what motiva ted the Judicial
Conference’s September 1998 abandonment of the March 1 benchmark start
date for interviews. Judges who did not honor the start date were thought by
the Judicial Conference to be engaging in a public act of lawlessness (even
though there was no official “law” to be broken). 87 For similar reasons the
NCAA and the Japanese Ministry of Labor gave up trying to regulate their
respective markets; they felt that their decision making bodies were cast in a
poor light by having made rules that many were not following. 88
Palliatives. Could some degree of compliance be achieved if each year,
at the close of the market, all clerk candidates were surveyed, and a summary
of the year’s events were circulated, indicating when first contacts were
reported, whether and when there were agreements in violation of any start
dates, and so forth? The great difficulty here would be that the report would of
course have to preserve student anonymity, and probably also omit judge
names (no student is going to report that Judge X, for whom the student will be
clerking, winked and nodded well in advance of the start date), and without
student or judge names it seems doubtful that the report would be very useful.
Another possible palliative would involve limiting the information
available to judges prior to the start date. Making it more difficult for judges to
gather information will impede their ability to move early, and so (for
example) the strategy of asking law schools to embargo letters of
recommendation until February 1, a strategy adopted by the Judicial
Conference in 1993 in connection with its establishment of a March 1 start
date,89 was a sensible way to try to reinforce the (failed) attempt to establish a
later appointment date. The fact that just such a strategy was partially
successful in the American medical market in the 1940s (as described in Part
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III.B.1 above) gave grounds for at least cautious optimism, especially since in
the medical market this strategy was effective at moving the date of
appointment back very substantially.
But the law clerk market, or at least the most competitive segment of
this market, is substantially smaller than the medical market. 90 In light of the
size of the law clerk market, the success or failure of any reform that depends
in part on an embargo on letters of recommendation may succeed or fail based
on how nearly universal compliance is achieved. Even a relatively small set of
“leaks,” if they systematically concern the most competitive part of the market,
has the potential to defeat the intent of the embargo. And it is very difficult to
prevent all leaks. It is particularly difficult to control informal contacts by
telephone, and these appear to be common in the law clerk market. 91 Of course
when other professors are offering pho ne recommendations prior to the
specified date, refusal by a given professor may harm his or her own students.
So the temptation to talk to a judge who has already started gathering
information about other candidates may be considerable.
In addition, as already noted, even if defections are perfectly
controlled, the start-date approach does not work well in giving parties a
chance to consider a wide range of possible transactions; the problem of
congestion will remain. And there are no palliatives for that problem. As noted
above, the start-date approach in the market for medical residency positions
was abandoned even though there did not appear to be significant problems
with defection; the reason was that the problems with congestion were thought
to be intolerable.
C. Centralized matching systems.
Many of the markets discussed in Part III, as well as numerous others
listed on Table 20, have progressed from stage 1 to stage 2 to stage 3, with
the final move coming after the (inevitable in all markets with which we are
familiar) failure of a stage 2 solution. A stage 3 solution involves a centralized
matching system, which allows participants’ preferences to be considered in an
orderly way and permits one to set the timing of the market at a desired point
(say, the third year of law school for the market for federal judicial law clerks),
as is currently the case in the market for medical residencies.
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1. The “monkey see, monkey do” approach: Adopt the medical
system as is.
One possibility is to adopt the medical system as is. Several
commentators have urged something like this approach for the law clerk
market. 92 Here is a recent succinct description of the medical match:
Each year . . . graduating physicians and other applicants
interview at residency programs throughout the country, and
then compose and submit Rank Order Lists (ROLs) to the
NRMP [National Resident Matching Program], each indicating
an applicant’s preference ordering among the positions for
which she has interviewed. Similarly, the residency programs
submit ROLs of the applicants they have interviewed, along
with the number of positions they wish to fill. The NRMP
processes these ROLs and capacities to produce a matching of
applicants to residency programs. 93
A few points bear emphasis here. First, the matching occurs after
personal interviews have been conducted. Neither residency programs nor
candidates are expected to make choices sight unseen for what are
relationships in which personality certainly may matter.
Second, the medical match reflects purely the preferences of the
participants for pairing with one another. It does not reflect some broader
aspect of social planning or engineering by a central authority. The match is
simply a way of facilitating the parties’ expression and achievement of their
preferences, an opportunity that is lacking in an unregulated market with
timing problems.
Third, the process is completely confidential. Neither side ever learns
how the other side ranked it. This seems critical in the clerkship context, as no
student would want the judge for whom he or she will be clerking to know that
the student ranked that judge far down on the list.
Fourth, the matching system is set up to accommodate the
preferences of married couples who wish to be in the same geographic
region. 94 It is also set up to accommodate other specialized preferences of
applicants and residency programs. 95
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Fifth, under the matching system participants can never gain from
submitting rankings that depart from their true preferences. In other words,
there is no possibility of gaining from ranking parties on the other side in a
strategic manner based on impressions of how those parties will be ranking the
initial party. 96
Might the medical match approach work in the law clerk market?
Prognosis. Not promising. The medical match does away with one of
the central problems identified above for a stage 2 solution—the fact that
congestion may occur on the start date. But the problem of implied agreements
between participants as a way of getting around the strictures of the imposed
agreement remains. Since judges and candidates are permitted to meet for
interviews before the match date, “offers” and “acceptances” can be
communicated well in advance of the centralized match. Just as in the situation
of the market for Canadian articling positions (see Part III.B.5 above), there is
nothing here to stop a judge from saying to a candidate: “I’ll rank you first in
the match if you rank me first.” Or consider a judge who is more subtle, saying
to a candidate:
You are my first choice. If I knew that I was your first choice,
I would just decide now to rank you first in the match. Of
course, if I am not your first choice, I need to consider other
candidates, and we won’t have any mutual commitment. But
if you tell me that I am your first choice, then I will know that
you will rank me first on your form, and I’ll relax now and not
worry about other candidates.
The subtext is:
Of course, I’m not asking you to make a commitment of the
kind that we’re not supposed to make. That would be
unethical on my part. I just want to understand your
preferences—that is part of what I try to accomplish at an
interview. Of course, only an unethical cad would mislead me
about his or her preferences, so I know that I can rely on what
you tell me.
No system will work unless it makes this kind of conversation untenable.
How is this sort of problem avoided in the medical match? Certainly it
is not entirely avoided; estimates suggest that 10% to 15% of students are
urged to make informal commitments to residency programs prior to the match
date.97 However, there has not been enough “winking” and “nodding” to bring
96

See id. at 770-71.
See Clark, supra note 59, at 1783 (reporting 1990 survey results
according to which 10.4% of students nationwide were pressured to make
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down the system or even weaken it in any significant way. The critical
difference from the law clerk market seems to be that informal promises are
far more likely to be binding when made to federal judges than when made to
residency programs. Studies of the medical match suggest that students feel
residency programs often lie to them, 98 and this may make students more
willing to violate a supposed informal understanding (since they feel residency
programs do this all the time). A key feature in the law clerk market may be
the relatively small number of judges in the relevant sector of the market. This
is an interesting feature of the law clerk context, since ordinarily smaller
markets make coordination easier. Here the small size of the market seems to
make informal agreements easier to enforce, and it is these informal but
binding agreements that present potential problems. Thus, just as the ability to
make informal agreements caused problems with the stage 2 solutions in the
markets for college bowls, clinical psychology positions, and Japanese
university graduates, this ability makes wholesale adoption of the medical
model in the law clerk setting—as several prior commentators have
advocated—highly problematic.
Palliatives. Adopt a modified medical match. (See below.)
2. A modified medical match.
a. Solving the problem of informal agreements.
Since informal agreements intended to circumvent a centralized
match seem so likely to be problematic in the law clerk market, a successful
centralized process would have to have a way of preventing them. One step
the Canadian articling market discussed above takes in response to this
problem is to require students to affirm on the form on which they submit
their ranking lists that they “have not accepted an articling position or made a
commitment to article in the [upcoming] articling year.”99 We propose a
informal commitments prior to the centralized match); Richard D. Pearson &
Allison H. Innes, Ensuring Compliance with NRMP Policy, 74 ACAD. MED.
747, 747 (1999) (reporting that 15% of 1996 and 1997 graduates of the
University of Virginia School of Medicine were asked for signals concerning
what rank order list they intended to submit to the centralized match).
98
For instance, a recent study found that 33% of student surveyed felt that
residency programs had lied to them during the process, and 58% were
skeptical of the sincerity of programs’ statements that they would be ranked
highly by the programs. See Kimberly D. Anderson, Donald M. Jacobs &
Amy V. Blue, Is Match Ethics an Oxymoron? 177 AMER. J. SURGERY 237,
238, 239 (1999).
99
See Law Society of Upper Canada, Articling Handbook for Principals
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similar approach for the law clerk market: each judge and each student who
participates in the centralized match should be required to certify, as a
condition of participation, that no prior understanding or agreement with a
student or a judge had been reached. The idea is to make destabilizing early
agreements nonbinding.
One way in which this certification requirement would make such
agreements nonbinding is that parties on the receiving end of impermissible
overtures seeking informal understandings would presumably feel less bound
to adhere to such understandings, given their explicitly forbidden status as
reflected in the certification requirement. A second, and critical, reason the
certification requirement might work is that if participants are explicitly
required to certify that no informal understanding was reached prior to the
match, then a judge who attempted to engineer such an understanding would
not be in a strong position to retaliate against any student (at least in an overt
manner) who ended up not ranking the judge highly. That is, it is hard to
imagine a judge complaining to colleagues, law professors, Supreme Court
Justices, or anyone else who might be in a position to influence a particular
applicant’s future that the applicant did not stick to an informal
understanding that the judge and candidate were explicitly required to certify
they did not make. And since students have far less power to retaliate against
judges, there seems little reason to worry about the problem from that end. 100
b. The scope of the centralized process.
A critical question in the context of a matching process for the market
for federal judicial law clerks is the scope of the match. The medical model is
that all (or virtually all) employers are included. But this model would not
make sense in the law clerk market, at least as a starting point. The
comprehensive model very quickly runs up against the fact that a notinsubstantial number of judges would probably be highly resistant to the idea
of a centralized match. In a 1989 survey of judges, only one-third expressed
support for a centralized match101 —although a very important caveat here is
that in the decade since 1989 the market has experienced many more debacles
100

Of course, each of the reasons just given also suggests that a similar sort
of certification might be he lpful in the context of a stage 2 solution, where an
offer start date is specified. But, as noted above, defections are only one of
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is greatly exacerbated when defections do not occur, is congestion on the
start date. This congestion, like the problem of informal agreements, prevents
parties from considering a range of options before making their decisions
and, in the medical context, led to the adoption of a stage 3 mechanism
apparently without any problem with defections.
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and several additional failures of attempts to impose stage 2 solutions,
meaning that the openness to a stage 3 approach might be greater.
A match of comprehensive scope also overlooks what seems to us to
be a very important feature of the law clerk market. This feature, which
emerges strongly from our judge surveys, is that there are two groups of
judges: those who are engendering the problems in the market, and the rest of
the judges, who perceive no problem obtaining qualified clerks and are not
eager to be part of any “solution” to what they do not consider to be their
problem. The first group of judges seems to think it is difficult to obtain the
clerks the judges desire, while the second does not view this as a problem.
Judges Wald and Kozinski are in the former camp, 102 and the judge author of
the present article (Posner) agrees with that point of view. Our judge surveys
provide many examples of judges in the other camp, as reflected in the
comments in Table 22.
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Table 22: Judges’ Perceptions of a Bifurcated Market
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#101c

I have never understood the serious competition between judges
for clerks. For nearly a quarter of a century, I had fine clerks,
turning down dozens of applicants who would have been equally
fine. Of course, I was employing clerks–not judges!

1999 Survey
#9

There are far more well qualified applicants than there are
positions available in the federal system.

1999 Survey
#83

There are far more good candidates than clerkships. The notion
that we judges have to compete with one another is misplaced. It’s
a buyer's market.

1999 Survey
#2

Although I do not interview, as a rule, until the winter or spring of
the year in which the law clerks start work, I have never had any
problems obtaining satisfactory law clerks.

1999 Survey
#4

There are plenty of able people out there.

1999 Survey
#8a

[T]here are plenty of good candidates

1999 Survey
#8b

I do not participate in the unseemly "rush" of second-year law
students (they have only one full year of grades when they apply)
for judicial clerkships. I interview in May and June of the year
preceding the Court year for which they are hired and find many
qualified candidates.

1999 Survey
#10

There are always excellent candidates available even late in the
year.

1999 Survey
#27

Even though hiring after only 3 semesters of law school is quite
early, my expertise of almost 10 years indicates that regardless of
the national strictures, I have a plethora of excellent applicants to
choose from after the super-stars have been cherry-picked -- I am
just not bothered by the "sooners", largely because I'm not that
interested in [unreadable]-hunting for #1 grad and top 5 schools.

1999 Survey
#30a

I do not find the system flawed. Hiring competent clerks has not
been a problem . . . .

1999 Survey
#34

There are far more qualified applicants than available positions.

1999 Survey
#57

There are plenty of good law grads to go around.

1999 Survey
#68

There are a lot of smart people out there.
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Table 22: Judges’ Perceptions of a Bifurcated Market (continued)
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#89

In the past two years I have not hired until spring of the year they
begin clerking. While the field is much smaller, I am content that I
have harvested clerks roughly equivalent to those hired from the
primary competitive field. I have not had to lower my demanding
standards.

1999 Survey
#95

There are plenty of well-qualified law school candidates out
there…. This "competition" business is nonsense. The judges so
obsessed with getting the very best must be awfully insecure about
their own abilities and intellect!!

2000 Survey
#99

[C]ompetition or not, I have always been able to secure fine clerks.

2000 Survey
#25

I have found many qualified candidates after the somewhat
hysterical selection process undertaken by many appellate judges
in the early spring.

2000 Survey
#47

There are many more well-qualified candidates than clerkships

2000 Survey
#102

There are plenty of outstanding applicants. I have always been
“behind the curve” in hiring but have always been able to secure
wonderful people to fill these positions!
I am disgusted by the "rat race" to hire prestigious law clerks. I
refuse to take part in it, and by doing so I have discovered many
highly qualified people –passed over by others–who have been
excellent law clerks.
There are lots of great fish in the sea. Without trying very hard, I
have gotten consistently excellent clerks, from many different law
schools.
It's a pain, mainly because there are a small number of grotesquely
aggressive judges out there who seem to think that if they don’t get
x or y to clerk for them they'll somehow suffer [irreparable] injury!
They need to chill out!
This is a “big, fancy law school” problem. If my colleagues
weren't such snobs about where their clerks come from, we'd be a
lot better off.
The judges who advertised themselves to the law schools as
running farm clubs for the Supreme Court seem to be energizing
most of the competitive problems.

2000 Survey
#91
2000 Survey
#69
2000 Survey
#63
2000 Survey
#72
1999 Survey
#82
2000 Survey
#83

This is a big school, fat-headed judge problem. Go away and
leave us alone. I'm serious.

Sources: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
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There are two possible explanations for the perceived limits on the
pool of top candidates in the view of the first group of judges. One
possibility is that the number of judges who perceive the need to hire “top”
candidates is large relative to the pool of such candidates. But perhaps a
more important explanation relates to the issue of Supreme Court clerkships.
Many judges want to attract applicants who will go on to clerk at the
Supreme Court, not only because of the intrinsic value of these clerks due to
their high ability, but also because such applicants have instrumental value to
the hiring judge in that they make the judge more attractive to future
candidates. 103 The role of Supreme Court clerkships can explain why there is
always a shortage of “best” clerks, since there is a fixed number of Supreme
Court clerkships. It can also explain why many judges (those not competing
to be Supreme Court feeders) seem to think that clerk quality is not a big
issue at all.
Picking up on the role of the Supreme Court, our proposed model for
a centralized match is that participation be required for the limited set of
federal appellate clerkships that may feed into Supreme Court clerkships,
with enforcement by the Supreme Court in a manner discussed more fully
below. 104 Thus, a judge who chooses not to participate in the centralized
match cannot feed any of his or her clerks to the Supreme Court. The judge
would decide whether to participate, and thus whether to be eligible to feed
clerks to the Court. A student would regain eligibility for a Supreme Court
clerkship by clerking for a judge who hired through the centralized match
following a clerkship with a judge who did not hire through this procedure.
Our proposed approach has several advantages relative to a
centralized match of comprehensive scope. First, it would not require
participation from, and cause inconvenience to, the judges who do not
perceive themselves to be the cause of any problem and do not feel the need
for any solution. This is a significant plus of the proposal. One of the clearest
lessons from the experience in various medical markets is that the degree of
participation of employers covered by the centralized process is critical to the
success of the process. 105 A high degree of participation seems much more
likely with the targeted approach than with a general approach embracing all
103

See Wald, supra note 2, at 154.
One judge suggested what seems to be a similar two-tier system but as a
means of enforcing a start date for offers, not a centralized match. The judge
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federal appellate judges. On the other hand, it must be recognized that there
may be some cost to requiring judges who want to hire outside the
centralized match to self- identify as nonfeeders. But our hunch (although at
this point it cannot be more than that) is that only a minority of federal
appellate judges would opt out of the centralized matching process and that
these judges—the sources of the comments quoted in Table 22—do not have
significant interest in being regarded as Supreme Court feeders anyway.
A second advantage of our targeted approach is that the great
majority of judges who currently engender the “competitive problems”
would almost certainly not want to opt out of the Supreme Court feeding
pool. Thus, the precise judges whose participation is most needed would be
most likely to participate in the match.
Enforcement of our proposed approach would be in the hands of the
Supreme Court. Would the Court go along? Our survey of the Justices
showed essentially unanimous agreement on two points: first, the current
state of the market for federal judicial law clerks is a mess, and something
should be done about it; and second, there are far more well-qualified
applicants for Supreme Court clerkships than slots available at the Court.
Thus, Supreme Court Justices are concerned about the status quo, and they
would be unlikely to find it a significant burden to limit themselves to clerks
hired through the match for initial clerkships, particularly given the judges
who are likely to participate in the match (as discussed just above).
Fundamentally, given the number of excellent applicants, there is little risk
that a Justice would gain much from defecting and hiring a stellar person
who did not participate in the match, since it would be easy for the Justice to
hire a very good person who did participate in the match. This is not to say
that the Justices would not perceive the regime to be a restriction on their
freedom; they surely would. It is simply to say that the restriction would be
limited in comparison to the significant potential benefit that they
themselves—many of them former appellate judges—seem interested in
achieving for the lower federal court system.
The most obvious difficulty with our proposed noncomprehensive
model is that some appellate judges who do not participate in the match may
try to hire fairly strong candidates before the match; these candidates might be
led to accept such offers if they are uncertain (as of course they often would
be) about their chances of getting a clerkship with one of the “Supreme Court
feeder” appellate judges participating in the match. This would in fact be much
like the problem that comes up in the present market; students accept offers
from less preferred judges because they do not know whether offers from more
preferred judges will materialize (see Table 10 above). This is precisely the
problem a centralized match is designed to solve. So if hiring did occur before
the centralized match, a more comprehensive approach might be desirable. But
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the tailored approach, which recognizes the two-tier market that many judges
feel currently exists, seems to us a good place to start.
A final question concerns clerkships that are not at the federal appellate
level but might conceivably feed into Supreme Court clerkships. Realistically,
this is not a concern. Although we do not have comprehensive data, in 19961997, when one of the present authors (Jolls) clerked at the Court, all of the
law clerks hailed from federal appellate clerkships.
c.

Attributes of a centralized process.

A number of arguments have been advanced in the existing legal
literature in support of a centralized matching process for the market for
federal judicial law clerks, and a number of objections to these arguments have
been offered.106 Although the existing debate has focused on a comprehensive
match rather than on the sort of match we propose here, many of the
arguments and objections are similar. Since they have been well rehearsed, we
discuss them fairly briefly.
i. Ability to consider a range of options.
Most fundamentally, a centralized clearinghouse vastly expands the
parties’ ability to consider a wide range of options before making their
decisions. This is the main advantage of a centralized matching system.
Some have objected to the idea of a matching system on the ground
that judges might have to conduct more interviews under such a system. 107
This might well be true, particularly in the early years until judges learned
how many interviews they needed to conduct in order to be sure they would
fill their slots. At the same time, in light of the number of interview
cancellations under the present system (see Part II.C.3.a above), it might well
be that too few interviews are being conducted at present. Moreover, with
improvements in technology it may be that interviews can be conducted via
videoconference. Already the Second Circuit is hearing a fair number of
cases from upstate New York and Vermont by videoconference.
In any event, the cost of having to conduct additional interviews
seems to be a cost that many judges are willing to bear in exchange for a
more orderly and sensible process. Our judge survey in both 1999 and 2000
posed this question: “In general, would you favor a regime (assumed to be
106
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fully enforceable) under which hiring occurred much later, say in the fall of
the third year, and in an orderly fashion; under which interviews could be
scheduled at a judge’s convenience, without the pressure of “beating” other
judges; but under which more interviews had to be conducted?” 75% of
judges said “yes” in 1999; 71% said yes in 2000. So many—although not
all—judges seem willing to bear the burden of more interviews in exchange
for the benefits that a match might bring. It also seems likely that the judges
most willing to bear the burden of more interviews are the ones most
dissatisfied and frustrated with the present system and, thus, most likely to
opt for participation in the targeted centralized match we propose.
ii. Reduced geographic bias.
A matching process would also significantly reduce the geographic
bias that may arise under a stage 2 solution to the unraveling problem. 108
Because the process would no longer be compressed into a very short time
frame (as under a stage 2 approach and, indeed, also in today’s unregulated
market), judges not near major cities, where students can visit many judges
in a short timeframe, would not be as disadvantaged. Also, since interviews
could occur at any time, candidates might be able to visit judges when they
are in the area for other reasons. But the latter point should not be overstated:
judges might well want to interview all of their candidates within a relatively
compressed time frame, so as to be able to make comparisons, and
candidates might not want to interview far earlier than other applicants for
fear that they would be forgotten by the time the judge got around to making
decisions on rankings for the centralized match. Thus it might be an
overestimate to suggest, as some advocates of matching systems have, that
students could interview at any time convenient to them, including while
flying out to intervie w for jobs at law firms. 109 Still, at a minimum,
interviews could be scheduled well in advance in a calm and nonchaotic
manner.
Note that the same factors that suggest a reduced geographic bias also
suggest reduced travel costs, since travel could be arranged well in advance.
Thus, although more interviews might, all else equal, mean higher travel
costs for students, 110 all else is not equal; instead of buying non-advancepurchase tickets in order to come on short notice, students could buy
discounted tickets, which are often only a fraction of the cost of full- fare
tickets. If discounted tickets are generally one- fifth (say) of the cost of full-
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fare tickets (which seems a reasonable estimate), then students could do five
times as many trips without increasing their travel costs.
iii. Balance and diversity of clerks.
The biggest objection that skeptics about a centralized match have
voiced is that it interferes with judges’ ability to ensure diversity and balance
across clerks. 111 The idea is that the attractiveness of one clerk will depend
on who his or her co-clerks will be.
This is an important point, but there are three responses to it. First,
the argument may overstate the degree of control judges have in the current
market. When a candidate is snatched away by another judge who has made
an exploding offer, as Part II.C.1.a showed occurs frequently at present, the
first judge is limited in his or her ability to achieve an optimally diverse and
balanced mix of clerks.
Second, the fact that, as noted above, a number of judges make offers
to a pool of candidates and fill their positions with the first offerees to accept
suggests that at least some judges do not regard the composition of their
clerk team as critical. 112
Third, and most important, the algorithm used in some matching
systems provides ways to deal with issues of diversity and balance. For
instance, the clinical psychology match allows conditions such as “not all
positions should be filled with candidates from the same school.” Similar
conditions apply in some of the British medical markets, where Edinburgh
urological surgeons are able to request what they regard as an appropriate
gender balance among the students with whom they are matched. 113 In
general, there is no theoretical difficulty in implementing restrictions of this
sort, in which some candidates are viewed as substitutes for other candidates
(for instance, candidates from the same school). Thus, it would be easy to
allow judges to say (for example) “not all positions should be filled with
candidates of the same sex.”

111

See Breyer, Becker & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 221-22; Kozinski, supra
note 1, at 1722.
112
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing this strategy).
113
See Alvin E. Roth, A Natural Experiment in the Organization of EntryLevel Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in
the United Kingdom, 81 AMER. ECON. REV. 415, 428 n.26 (1991).
85

iv. Impersonal nature of the match.
Another criticism that has been offered of a centralized match is that
it would undermine the “highly personal relationship between judge and
clerk.”114 Judge Kozinski writes:
The selection process—for all its expense and pain and
disappointment and hardship—is the crucible wherein the
foundation of that relationship [between judge and clerk] is
forged. The time a judge spends talking to professors and
reading draft law review notes; the student’s efforts devoted
to reading the judge’s opinions; the time judge and clerk
spend in interviews; the weighing of competing
possibilities—all these help bring the parties psychologically
to the point where they are ready to make a commitment to
each other. 115
The difficulty with this argument is that all of these things would continue to
happen under a matching system (interviews, talking with recommenders,
clerk preparation for the interview, etc.). The only thing that would be absent
is what Judge Kozinski describes later as the “electrifying” moment when a
student says, “Yes, judge, I accept” in person (or on the phone). 116 Judge
Kozinski asks, “How will the bond between judge and clerk be affected
when offer and acceptance are so impersonal? How will the emotional
content of the relationship be diminished by the inherently protracted delay
between interview and computer communication?”117 Whatever the answers
to these questions (and we doubt that the mode of offer and acceptance has
much significance in the overall nature of the judge-clerk relationship), we
would be surprised if, for most participants in the law clerk market, this issue
outweighed all of the other serious problems and inefficiencies of a stage 1
or stage 2 market. The survey evidence described in Part II above certainly
suggests that neither judges nor students generally regard the current process
as an auspicious beginning to the judge-clerk relationship.
v. Changes of mind.
Another issue raised by critics of a centralized match is that some
candidates or judges might find their match unacceptable in reality “even
though it might have seemed acceptable as a remote contingency far down a
list of happier possibilities.”118 This is a concern, for saying yes to a specific
114
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offer out there (or making an offer to a specific candidate) seems different
from listing a particular judge or candidate on a form that will be processed
sometime down the road. But this risk must be weighed against the fact that
candidates change their mind in the current market as well, due we think
largely to the early time at which decisions must be made. For example, a
few years ago a Harvard Law School student accepted an offer with a
prominent D.C. Circuit judge two years ahead of the time at which the
clerkship was to begin and then, a year or so later, informed the judge that he
would not be doing the clerkship after all. With the market occurring at a
later date and in a more orderly fashion, changes of mind on grounds of
changed circumstances or changed preferences would be far less likely.
vi. Bargaining power.
One of the design questions that must be settled in constructing a
match is which side of the market “makes offers” and which side “accepts or
rejects” offers. (Of course these terms do not have their ordinary meanings in
a centralized matching process, but the concept is similar to who makes and
receives offers in a decentralized market.) In most matches we know of, this
issue has been settled by appeal to the practice in the decentralized market;
thus, in a match for the law clerk market, judges would retain the initiative.
Interestingly, the recent redesign of the medical match reverses this: the
match is now conducted so that medical students have the initiative, and
(within the internal operation of the match algorithm) residency programs are
treated as if they accept or reject the offers (or applications) of the
students. 119 But it turns out that the two approaches yield largely similar
results as a practical matter in any event. 120
d. Transition and administrative issues.
The medical match occurs in March of the last year of medical school.
Ultimately a similar sort of time frame may be desirable for the market for
federal judicial law clerks. But initially it might be best to have the law clerk
market occur earlier than the winter or spring of the third year. The reason is
that it might ease the transition. “Both the models and the experience of the
many markets that have attempted to halt unraveling suggest that a cautious
plan of attack” would be to introduce a central match “initially at an early time,
when a substantial percentage of transactions are already taking place, and
then to move the time at which the mechanism operates later only after it has
attracted a high rate of participation.”121
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Having the process go early would mean that initially only the benefits
from a more orderly process, and not the benefits from later hiring, would be
achieved. But even the former benefits seem likely to be significant,
particularly from the perspective of what seems to be the judges’ primary
concern, the way in which the process casts the judiciary in a negative light.
The modified match we have proposed here could be administered by
an outside firm skilled in running matches such as the medical residenc y
matching program and the clinical psychology matching program.
Alternatively, the match could be administered by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts or some other judicially-related entity, presumably
with some technical help from an outside organization.
e. Trouble signs in a modified match.
i. Movement from a stage 3 to a stage 4 market.
A lesson from the other markets discussed in Part III above is that even
a stage 3 mechanism that is working well can on occasion be threatened by
unraveling problems. One source of such problems is summer-associate-type
positions that effectively amount to “prematching” in advance of the
centralized match. This is stage 4 in the typology described in Part III.A.
The possibility of such “prematching” is unlikely, however, to bring
down a centralized match, assuming it gets up and running successfully. If
“prematching” were to become very significant—as in the case discussed in
Part III.B.5 above in which 80% of participants in a match submitted only one
alternative, making it clear that everything had been settled in advance—then
the centralized clearinghouse might have to be abandoned, but this has not
occurred in other markets with centralized matches that produce stable
outcomes. The situation of 80% prematching occurred in a match that used a
nonstable matching algorithm. 122
ii. Informal agreements in contravention of the certification
requirement.
A separate trouble sign in a modified match in the market for federal
judicial law clerks would be the reliance of parties on informal prematch
understandings
(unrelated
to
summer-associate-type
positions)
notwithstanding the certification requirement described in Part IV.C.2.a above.
A possible response, if such a problem were to develop, would be the use of a
small degree to randomization in the match to destabilize the informal
understandings. The somewhat speculative randomization proposal we offer
here is meant to suggest one way of dealing with the problem of informal
122
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understandings in contravention of the centralized match. We realize that most
judges are not accustomed to thinking in explicitly statistical terms, so this
proposal may cause a certain culture shock.
Suppose that an anonymous hotline were set up to monitor
compliance with the prohibition on informal understandings reflected in the
certification requirement. If this hotline showed that some threshold of
noncompliance had been reached (say 1% of candidates, or 1% of the total
number of positions), then it could be announced that 5% (for example) of
applicants would have their first and second choices randomized in the
centralized match. That is, for 5% of applicants, there would be a 50%
chance of having their second choice judge ranked as their first choice and
vice versa. (If no second choice judge was listed, the student would have a
50% chance of not being matched at all.) This would give these applicants a
smaller than 50% chance (with the precise number depending on the
preferences of both their first and second choice judges) of consequently
being matched to their second choice judge even if their first choice judge
wanted them. This would provide all students (not just the 5%) with the
ability to avoid any understanding that they would put Judge A first when
they preferred Judge B, since no one would know which students’ choices
had been randomized; a candidate could simply say to Judge A (who thought
an understanding with the candidate had been reached) that “randomization
must have kicked in.” It would be important not to set the threshold number
of reports required for randomization too high, since receiving the sort of
informal overture described above from a judge might well produce
sufficient excitement on the part of a clerkship candidate eager to put the
process behind him or her that the candidate would not call even an
anonymous hotline.
Hopefully the threat of randomization—and the statement that this
would make about judges’ behavior—would be enough to deter a sufficiently
large number of judges from reaching informal understandings that the
randomization would not ever have to kick in. But the knowledge that in any
given year randomization could always kick in would help to deter such
informal understandings in the first place, since there would be some
question as to how reliable they were. Even in years in which randomization
would actually occur, it would, we think, probably produce fewer negative
effects than the current system (although it should be acknowledged that the
negative effects would be of a different character). Obviously the prospect of
intentionally failing to put together pairs who want to be with one another is
troubling and could certainly produce perceptions of unfairness; but so too is,
and does, the current free- for-all.
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V. Conclusion
The hiring process for federal judicial law clerks has engendered
intense dissatisfaction among both judges and students. Hiring occurs earlier
and earlier—now often early in the student’s second year of law school—and
in a rushed, chaotic process that resembles a game of musical chairs, in
which frequently neither judges nor students make their most desired
matches. Efforts to reform the process have been attempted over the years,
with a complete lack of success.
Our study has differed from the earlier literature on this baffling and
frustrating issue in three major respects. First, we have placed the issue
within the context of economic theory that identifies the incentives and
constraints, and the private and social costs and benefits, that lead to the
“unraveling” of certain markets. Second, we have situated the clerkship
hiring market within the range of markets that have exhibited similar
problems and experienced a wide variety of attempted and achieved
solutions. And third, we have conducted a far deeper and wider-ranging
empirical survey of judicial and applicant attitudes and behaviors than any
previous students of this subject.
It would be nice to be able to report that on the basis of this
unprecedented research effort we have come up with a clear solution to the
problem. But we have not. The problem is stubborn, intractable; this is plain
as a matter of theory and as a matter of experience in this and other markets.
The solutions that have been tried and sometimes succeeded in the other
markets are unlikely to work as well in the clerkship hiring market because of
subtle differences.
A mature appreciation of the recalcitrance of the world to reformers’
efforts requires recognition that many social and economic problems cannot
be solved and can only be lived with. Nevertheless, not being given to
fatalism, we have suggested a partial solution, which would require Court of
Appeals judges who want to be “feeder” judges, that is, who want their clerks
to go on to clerk for Justices of the United States Supreme Court, to enroll in
a computerized matching system that would, for those judges and the
students applying to them for clerkships, very largely eliminate the
congestion, information, and resulting mismatching problems of the present
system. More generally, we believe strongly that the Supreme Court could
play an important and productive role in helping to organize and improve the
market for federal judicial law clerks. We commend our suggested solution
to the attention of the relevant decision makers. But we hope that apart from
its merits and any criticisms that may be lodged against it, our study will be
seen to have permanent value in framing and illuminating a most interesting,
if difficult, market problem.
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Data Appendix—The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
Table A1: Response Rates by Seniority Status and Circuit,
1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys
Group of federal
appellate judges

Number of
judges
surveyed
1999
2000

Number of
Percent of
judges
surveyed judges
responding
responding
1999 2000 1999 2000

All judges

238

238

155

129

65%

54%

Active judges

161

159

103

84

64%

53%

Senior judges

77

79

51

45

66%

57%

Senior status not listed

N/A

N/A

1

0

N/A

N/A

1st Circuit

11

10

8

7

73%

70%

2nd Circuit

20

21

9

10

45%

48%

3rd Circuit

18

19

13

13

72%

68%

4th Circuit

16

13

10

6

63%

46%

5th Circuit

20

19

9

10

45%

53%

6th Circuit

23

22

16

11

70%

50%

7th Circuit

13

15

10

9

77%

60%

8th Circuit

17

18

11

15

65%

83%

9th Circuit

40

43

27

17

68%

40%

10th Circuit

16

15

11

8

69%

53%

11th Circuit

18

17

11

8

61%

47%

D.C. Circuit

11

11

7

6

64%

55%

Federal Circuit

15

15

11

9

73%

60%

No circuit listed

N/A

N/A

2

0

N/A

N/A

Sources: Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (1999) (1999 data on active and senior
judges); Judicial Yellow Book , Spring 2000 (2000 data on active and senior judges);
1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys (survey response rates).

91

Table A2: The Importance of Membership in the School’s Main Law
Review to Judges’ Hiring Decisions
Ranking of the importance of membership in
the school’s main law reviewa
1

Number of
judges
6

Cumulative
percentage
5

2

23

25

3

11

34

4

14

47

5

8

53

6

8

60

7

7

66

8 or belowb

7

72

a factor, but not ranked

7

78

not a factor

25

100

Total number of judges responding: 116
Source: 2000 Judge Survey.
a
Ties in rankings were resolved by assuming that law review membership received the
higher ranking, so if anything the data reported here overstate the importance of law
review membership.
b
Some judges wrote in additional selection criteria, so it was possible for one of our
eight listed criteria to receive a ranking below 8.
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Table A3: Representation of Students from Top Law Schools
in Federal Appellate Clerkships
Institution

Top four:
Yale
Stanford
Harvard
Chicago

U.S. News &
World Report
Ranking

Number of
Law Clerks

Size of Class

1
2
3
6

45
16
56
26

192
182
552
188

143

1114

21
22
13
13
17
7

443
389
356
282
363
182

93

2015

10
10
4
20
4
10
1
4
2
3

214
217
252
587
470
319
203
187
235
122

68

2796

Total
Next six:
NYU
Columbia
Michigan
Berkeley
Virginia
Cornell

4
5
7
8
9
10

Total
Next ten:
Dukea
Northwestern
Penn
Georgetown
Texas
UCLA
USC
Vanderbilt
Minnesota
Washington and Lee
Total

10a
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Sources: http://www.usnews.com/edu/beyond/gradrank/law/gdlawt1.htm (visited
8/17/00) (U.S. News rankings and number of J.D. students (divided by three to get
class size)); Judicial Yellow Book , Spring 2000 (law clerk data).
a
Tied with Cornell.
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Table A4: Response Rates of Students By School and By Applicant
Status, 1999 Second-Year Survey
Group

All seven schools

337

Number of respondents
who applied for federal
clerkships in 1998-1999
143

Top four schools:
Yale
Stanford
Harvard
Chicago

51
72
114
30

33
24
40
13

267

110

26
13
31

13
5
15

70

33

Total
Other schools surveyed:
Columbia
Michigan
Vanderbilt

Number of students
responding

Total
Source: 1999 Second-Year Student Survey.
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Table A5: Hiring of Third-Year and Post-Graduate Candidates,
1999-2000
Percent of judges whose hiring of third-year
students for 2001-2002 clerkships was
Higher than
Lower than
About the same as
their level of hiring of third-year students in
previous years
Percent of judges whose hiring of post- graduates
for 2001-2002 clerkships was
Higher than
Lower than
About the same as
their level of hiring of post-graduates in previous
years
Number of third-year students hired for 20012002 clerkships as of the date of the judge
survey

9%
14%
77%

10%
13%
77%

35

As a percent of total hires completed at the time
of the judge surveya
Number of post- graduates hired for 2001-2002
clerkships as of the date of the judge survey

12%

As a percent of total hiring completed at the time
of the judge surveya

13%

38

Source: 2000 Judge Survey.
a
299 total completed hires were reported by judges responding to the survey.
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Table A6: Judges’ Reasons for Making Offers Before Completing
Scheduled Interviews, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000
Survey

Judge’s reason for making offers before completing
scheduled interviews

1999 Survey #105
1999 Survey #73
1999 Survey #18
1999 Survey #91

Avoid loss to other judge(s).
Because candidates were already accepting offers elsewhere.
Because I had to compete with other offering judges.
Because I really liked her and everything moved so fast this year
- plus, so many were dropping out before they interviewed with
me. In any event, she took a position with the judge she
interviewed with after me - see below.
1999 Survey
Because I told each interviewee that I would be prepared to
#106a
consider making an offer should they be pressed by another
judge and required to accept within a specified period of time.
1999 Survey #36 Because I was pretty certain the candidate would receive an
offer instanter!
1999 Survey
Because if I see a candidate I like I give them an offer.
#112b
1999 Survey #90 Because of the issue in the previous question [referring to
cancellations of interviews by applicants].
1999 Survey #8 Because other judges were hiring candidates away.
1999 Survey #38 Because other judges were making offers to students that I was
interviewing.
1999 Survey #42 Competition.
1999 Survey #33 Did not want to lose outstanding applicants.
1999 Survey #22 Excellent candidate I didn't want to lose.
1999 Survey #45 Excellent candidate who had other options.
1999 Survey #31 Hired one exceptionally qualified candidate on the spot (figured
she'd be gone if I waited).
1999 Survey #112 I found a good candidate and didn't want to lose him/her.
1999 Survey #53b I had to act fast as this candidate was sure to receive other offers
in the days ahead.
1999 Survey #17 I learned from experience that if I waited to complete all
interviews before making offers quite a few applicants would
withdraw.
1999 Survey #25 I thought I would lose good prospects if I didn't.
1999 Survey #8d If I liked a candidate, I made an offer at the interview. The
reason I did not want to wait until all interviews wee over was
to minimize the risk of losing candidates who would want to
clerk for me.
1999 Survey #67 Impression that many offers with short deadlines were being
made.

96

Table A6: Judges’ Reasons for Making Offers Before Completing
Scheduled Interviews, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 (continued)
Survey

Judge’s reason for making offers before completing
scheduled interviews

1999 Survey #30 My staff consists of 4 clerks and 1 secretary. I had to recruit a
whole staff ( including a new secretary) in early 1999. One of
my most promising applicants notified me she had been hired by
one of my colleagues in November or December 1998. Under
these circumstances, I felt that I had to accelerate my
recruitment as much as possible.
1999 Survey #104 Otherwise they would be gone, based on prior years.
1999 Survey #3d Outstanding applicants who would be taken by another judge if
I did not act.
1999 Survey #82 Perceived competition from other judges.
1999 Survey #24 Pressured by a student to match an offer.
1999 Survey #187 Satisfaction with candidate, desire not to lose candidate to
another offer.
1999 Survey #18c So as to be able to compete.
1999 Survey #21 So other judges would not hire someone I really thought highly
of.
1999 Survey #53 The best candidates disappear fast.
1999 Survey #97 To keep from losing a good clerk to some other judge.
1999 Survey #99 To prevent that applicant from being hired by someone else
before I completed interviews.
2000 Survey #69 A bird in the hand . . . .
2000 Survey #41 Afraid they would be hired by someone else.
2000 Survey #75 Applicant already had an offer.
2000 Survey #73 As I learned recruiting for a law firm, it is an effective and
necessary procedure.
2000 Survey #45 Because applicants had other offers already.
2000 Survey #119 Because if I see a good applicant, I want to make an offer before
the person has been hired.
2000 Survey #46 Because the candidate was so good, I knew form experience that
she would receive and probably accept another offer if I waited
any longer.
2000 Survey #33a Competition and pressure to finish.
2000 Survey #28 Good candidate-would have accepted another offer.
2000 Survey #80 I did this for the first time ever, because almost none of the
interviewees wanted to take my 2-year position, and this
excellent candidate did; plus the candidate said that the school
had instructed the students that they "had" to take the first offer
given, and the candidate was headed immediately for additional
interviews.
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Table A6: Judges’ Reasons for Making Offers Before Completing
Scheduled Interviews, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 (continued)
Survey

Judge’s reason for making offers before completing
scheduled interviews

2000 Survey #76 I started late (later than other judges) and good candidates were
being hired by other judges.
2000 Survey #37 If I think a candidate would be an excellent choice I like to wrap
up my efforts and leave it to the candidate. Also, the longer the
process drags on, the more likely that someone else will make
him/her an offer resulting in nothing to show for our efforts.
2000 Survey #114 Obtain clerk who was offered another clerkship.
2000 Survey #5 Outstanding applicant who would be hired by another judge if I
did not act.
2000 Survey #43 Rolling admission to keep from losing clearly acceptable clerk
applicant.
2000 Survey #74a To avoid losing the really good applicants.
2000 Survey #100 To hire a good candidate before someone else did.
2000 Survey #18 To meet competition. However, at all times I had at least two
offers open.
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
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Table A7: Student Comments About the Decision Not to Apply−
Concerns About the Nature of the Process and Early Hiring, 1999
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#199

[The market] certainly seems like a hellish experience and that
definitely contributed to my decision not to apply.

1999 Survey
#210

[My decision not to apply] was at least in part because of disgust
with the process.

1999 Survey
#202

I think the current system is absurd and I have yet to hear a
sufficient rationale for it. Frankly, I chose not to apply not because I
am uninterested, but because of the process.

1999 Survey
#211

The reason I chose not to [apply] was . . . I was exhausted from fall
interviews and was not ready to begin the process again. [Also,] I
had spoken with many people about it and their tremendous
frustration with the process discouraged me.

1999 Survey
#196

Terrible market. The reason I did not apply was [that] I was burnt
out from 2L law firm interviewing and because it forced me to
decide to[o] early where I wanted to be two years from now. And
the process is a hodgepodge lottery.

1999 Survey
#16

The biggest concern that I had was that I had to be getting my
application packets together so that they could do out in Dec.-Jan.
That meant that the more judges I would apply to, the less time I
would have to study for finals etc.

1999 Survey
#201

[The process] was especially not attractive so soon after the 2L
summer job search.

1999 Survey
#14

[The] scheduling [of the market] (time of year when students must
apply) is tremendously inconvenient. [This is part of the reason
that] I, while theoretically very interested, chose not to apply. I
hope too many others weren’t similarly dissuaded.

Source: 1999 Second-Year Student Survey.
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Table A8: Timing of the Market by Circuit, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000
Number of judges
from Circuit

Number of judges as a
percent of total
responses from Circuit
1998-1999 1999-2000 1998-1999 1999-2000
Started interviewing
and making offers by
Jan. 31
1st Circuit
2ndCircuit
3rd Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
6th Circuit
7th Circuit
8th Circuit
9th Circuit
10th Circuit
11th Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
Total

2
4
4
3
0
6
0
3
6
2
2
2
3
37

4
7
6
2
6
6
6
10
14
7
3
6
2
79

40%
44%
33%
33%
0%
40%
0%
30%
26%
22%
29%
29%
30%
28%

80%
70%
38%
100%
63%
63%
71%
60%
80%
88%
50%
100%
11%
71%

Done with interviews
and offers by Jan. 31
1st Circuit
2nd Circuit
3rd Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
6th Circuit
7th Circuit
8th Circuit
9th Circuit
10th Circuit
11th Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
Total

2
2
3
1
0
5
0
3
3
0
1
0
2
22

4
7
5
2
5
5
5
9
12
7
3
6
1
71

40%
22%
25%
11%
0%
33%
0%
30%
13%
0%
14%
0%
20%
17%

80%
70%
38%
100%
63%
63%
71%
60%
80%
88%
50%
100%
11%
63%

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
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Table A9-1: Student Perceptions Regarding the Timing of the 1999-2000
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks—General Comments
Survey

Comment

Survey #25

I ended up having to miss the entire last week of classes to fly out
to five or six interviews on the west coast, arriving back the day
before my first exam for which I was entirely unable to study. …
Although I'm happy (and lucky) to have ended up with what looks
like an exciting job opportunity, I'm sure I'd perform better at it had
I been able to catch the Establishment clause in Con law.

Survey #34

To have a shot at appellate court clerkships you have to apply in
the middle of Harvard's interviewing season. It's ridiculous that
the process is so front-loaded with lots of clerkships awarded in
October and November. 2Ls in the fall have little by the way of
writing samples and only one year’s grades.

Survey #165

Judges need to be sensitive to the fact that travelling in December
imposes enormous costs. My fall grades reflect the fact that I did
not have adequate time to pull together the course material.

Survey #263

[T]he timing meant that some of us were interviewing during
finals . . . , obviously a particularly bad time to be travelling and
preparing well for an interview.

Survey #28

Trying to apply for clerkships, do call back interviews [with law
firms], 2nd year Ames [moot court competition] and normal
classwork was absolute hell.”

Survey #32

I couldn’t postpone my interviews to study [for exams]. I believe
that I experienced adverse effects on my performance as a result.

Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey.
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Table A9-2: Student Perceptions Regarding the Timing of the 19992000 Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks—Statements About
Difficult Things in the Hiring Process
Survey

“One of the most difficult things in the [clerkship hiring]
process was”…

Survey #17

Trying to schedule all of my interviews right before finals.

Survey #19

Having to deal with the cle rkship application process so soon after
the fall summer job interviewing season.

Survey #55

Scheduling during exam period.

Survey #58

Sending out clerkship applications, deciding on summer work and
studying for finals at the same time.

Survey #60

Juggling clerkship applications, summer job interviews and finals.

Survey #165

Scheduling and attending interviews during exam week.

Survey #166

Scheduling interviews on week before finals.

Survey #169

Trying to balance applications, interviews for summer
associateships, . . . and studying.

Survey #196

Dealing with clerkship and summer law firm process
simultaneously.

Survey #199

Ramping up . . . for application in the beginning of the 2nd year
(while interviewing with firms).

Survey #206

Having to interview during finals reading period.

Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey.

102

Table A10: The Role of References from Classmates
Survey

Comment

1999 Survey
#154a

In an e-mail headed ‘The Dish,’ one Washington, D.C. clerk leaked
me the names of my classmates who had made the judge’s shortlist.
In exchange for the gossip, he asked me to rank my peers. It didn’t
matter that I hadn’t worked directly with them and knew nothing of
their writing skills. It didn’t matter that after a year and a half of
law school, I had limited experience to know what makes a good
clerk.

1999 Survey
#119

On the D.C. Circuit, peer references were being used to extend
interviews and offers. I think [it’s] offensive that someone could get
a desired clerkship because she had a good friend who made calls
on her behalf.

1999 Survey
#164

[A third-year student who would be clerking for a particular D.C.
Circuit judge the following year] may have put the good word in.
Judges called 3L’s in law review.

1999 Survey
#122

Third year law students play an enormous role. The clerks sort
through the resumes and then call their buddies in the class below
and ask who to interview. This was especially important when no
one had any grades in to speak of because the process began so
soon.

1999 Survey
#43

A 3L friend from undergrad. at Harvard who will be clerking for [a
particular judge] . . . established contact with clerks in particular
chambers.

2000 Survey
#3

[A] 3L (future clerk) . . . recommended me to his future judge.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys.
a
This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written
about the market for federal judicial law clerks.
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Table A11: The Importance of Recommendations from Familiar Professors
to Judges’ Hiri ng Decisions
Ranking of the importance of
recommendation from a familiar professora

Number of
judges

Cumulative
percentage

1

26

22

2

23

42

3

21

60

4

10

69

5

5

73

6

4

77

7

1

78

8 or belowb

0

78

a factor, but not ranked

11

87

not a factor

15

100

Total number of judges responding: 116
Source: 2000 Judge Survey.
a
Ties in rankings were resolved by assuming that recommendations from a familiar
professor received the higher ranking, so if anything the data reported here overstate
the importance of such recommendations.
b
Some judges wrote in additional selection criteria, so it was possible for one of our
eight listed criteria to receive a ranking below 8.
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Table A12: The Role of Faculty Clerkship Brokers
Survey

Comment

1999 Student
Survey #134

One of my professors gave me a glowing review when the judge
called him, and 15 minutes later I got the offer.

1999 Student
Survey #116

[Professor X] definitely got me several interviews by calling on
my behalf. [Professor Y] got me at least the [interview with a
particular prominent Eastern seaboard judge] ([that judge] told
me), and probably [another judge].

1999 Student
Survey #1

[Dean X] got me the . . . interview [with a prominent Ninth Circuit
judge].

1999 Student
Survey #119

One professor basically got me an interview with [a prominent
D.C. Circuit judge].

1999 Student
Survey #9

One recommender took a very active role in the process. I can tell
because he clerked for a particular judge who offered an interview,
lobbied the judge on my behalf, and served as a messenger to let
me know where the judge's hiring was going. He also called to
discuss how I felt about different judges/circuits.

1999 Student
Survey #114

One of my professors really wanted me to clerk for a particular
judge. But that judge never called me. When I accepted a state
clerkship, this professor was upset and called the judge who she
wanted me to clerk for, only to find that the reason this judge
hadn’t called me was that she hadn’t started interviewing yet. . . .
This judge now thinks that I will reapply next year, and my guess
is that she will at least interview me.

2000 Student
Survey #37

My recommender got me many interviews I wouldn’t have gotten
on my own because he was friends with many judges.

2000 Student
Survey #167

My professor nominated the judge I interviewed with.

2000 Student
Survey #235

I told a professor whom I’m close to that I would very much like
to interview with my 1st choice judge. At that point, the judge had
not called me back after I told the chambers that I’d be in his city
the following week. My professor made a call on my behalf.
Immediately after the call, the judge called to tell me he’d be
incredibly excited to see me. After the judge’s call, my professor
called me to make sure the judge called. I received my offer at the
interview. Months later, when my judge sent a letter to all his
2001-2002 clerks describing the other clerks, he pretty much wrote
in my description that he trusted “his friend” (my professor).
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Table A12: The Role of Faculty Clerkship Brokers (continued)
Survey

Comment

2000 Student
Survey #266

One of my professors called the judge I will be clerking for and
played an integral role in my getting the interview and clerkship.

2000 Student
Survey #252

[The] dean of [the student’s] law school, good friends with [a
particular] judge, called him on my behalf.

2000 Student
Survey #209

[V]arious [faculty from the student’s school] played enormous
roles getting me interviews with the three judges I applied to.

2000 Student
Survey #165

[O]ne of my recommenders carried considerable weight with
several judges. I was told several times that her name and
recommendation secured my interview.

2000 Student
Survey #8

A professor called to get me an interview despite the fact that all
interviews had been filled.

1999 Judge
Survey #52

[I] delegate[] [hiring] to [the] Clerkship Committee at a Law
School.

1999 Judge
Survey #61

I always take (or almost always) one law clerk from Harvard,
recommended by my classmate, [Professor Z].

1999 Judge
Survey #52

[I have] arrangement w[ith] [a] law school: I hire people we
mutually agree on: The interview is a formality ([and] sometimes I
hire w[ithout] interviews).

2000 Judge
Survey #70

[A]t least one of my clerks is, in effect, picked by a certain law
professor.

Sources: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys; 1999 and 2000 Judge
Surveys.

106

Readers with comments should address them to:
Judge Richard A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
Phone: 773-702-9608
E-mail: bdayton@law.uchicago.edu
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